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ABSTRACT 
 Three Essays Concerning Economic Analysis Associated with the Supply Chain. 
 
 (August 2006) 
Pablo Sherwell Cabello, B.S., Universidad de las Américas-Puebla;  
M.A., Texas Tech University 
 Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Oral Capps, Jr. 
                                                                                     Dr. Victoria Salin 
 
Analyzing different aspects of the supply chain aids in understanding how firms 
behave, interact and respond within an industry. Some concepts used to carry out this 
analysis include asymmetric price transmission, event study methodology and event 
costing analysis. Each of these topics is discussed in this dissertation, presented as a set 
of three separate papers.  
The first paper analyzes asymmetric price transmission and elasticities of price 
transmission at the farm-retail level for whole and two percent milk in selected cities in 
the United States. The theoretical core of this paper relies on a comparison between the 
traditional Houck approach and the error correction model proposed by von Cramon-
Taubadel and Fahlbusch. We reject the null hypothesis of symmetry for each product 
and city under both approaches. We also find little evidence of statistical superiority 
between the classic Houck approach and the error correction model.  
The second paper uses financial market event study methodology to calculate the 
economic impact on the supply chain related to one of the worst disease outbreaks in the 
food industry in the United States. This event began on November 3, 2003, when the 
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Associated Press reported a hepatitis advisory in the Beaver Valley, Pennsylvania. This 
outbreak directly involved two publicly traded companies: Prandium and Sysco. The 
market model is used as the main foundation of the economic analysis. There is no 
evidence of abnormal rates of return or spillover effects in relation to the outbreak. 
However, there is evidence that volatility of returns increases after the event.   
The third paper develops a general conceptual economic module to quantify the 
impact of an animal disease outbreak. This study develops a generic economic module, 
which estimates cost in the face of a simulated animal disease outbreak under different 
mitigation strategies. This model was subsequently applied in a case study: a 
hypothetical case of a foot-and-mouth (FMD) outbreak in the Texas Panhandle analyzed 
under five different ex-post mitigation strategies. The results show that the most 
effective strategy is to slaughter and not to vaccinate.  
We conclude that analyzing the supply chain is important in understanding how 
markets behave.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION1 
 
International and domestic market integration has brought many opportunities to 
businesses and consumers. Today, small, medium and large firms have the advantage of 
operating in different markets, allowing them to minimize their costs and maximize their 
profits through better integration in the supply chain. By definition, supply chain is the 
set of autonomous or semi-autonomous businesses collectively responsible to produce, 
manufacture and distribution of one or more related products, Jayashankar et al (1995).   
Today, many firms depend on a high level of integration in regional, national and 
international markets in order to reach economies of scale, compete and grow. However, 
this market integration makes supply chain analysis more complex.  The higher the 
dynamics and players in the supply chain, the higher the complexity to analyze it. For 
example, agricultural firms are integrated, both vertically and horizontally, in many 
domestic and international markets. Thus it is important to understand how local farms 
react to international markets. For instance, the transmission of prices from one market 
to another is one important pattern that economists study.  
Price transmission analysis aids in understanding how markets are integrated at 
different levels, i.e. regional, national or international. Moreover, this type of analysis 
allows economists to explore how economic agents, such as producer and retailers, 
interact among themselves.   
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of American Economic Review. 
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Knowing how prices flow along the supply chain is important for price 
determination and price reaction at a firm level. Moreover, price transmission analysis 
aims to determine the level of market efficiency. If prices are rigid, that is, not channeled 
fully between agents, there could be concentration of the markets, high transaction costs 
or there might be some governmental policies that are preventing the markets from 
operating efficiently. For example, if prices do not transmit fully, i.e. from a producer to 
a distributor, the market may be concentrated due to the power that one agent may have 
over another.  
Most of the empirical studies that test for the presence of asymmetric price 
transmission have been based on a variable-splitting technique developed by Wolffram 
(1971) and later adapted by Houck (1977) and Ward (1982). This technique, 
conventionally called the Houck approach, has been employed in the agricultural 
economics literature in considering asymmetric price transmission. 
However, since prices tend to be cointegrated, Von Cramon-Taubadel and 
Fahlbusch (1994) demonstrated that an asymmetric error correction model (ECM) based 
on the work of Granger and Lee (1989) could be more appropriate to test for asymmetric 
price transmission. Von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy (1999) extended this application of 
the asymmetric ECM and concluded that this method was more appropriate than the use 
of the conventional Houck.  
A natural extension of the price transmission analysis is the calculation of the 
elasticities of price transmission (EPT), which has not received much covered in the 
literature. EPT’s measure the percentage change in retail price of a commodity due to a 
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one percent change in farm price. Segmenting the elasticity of price transmission will 
capture the positive and negative changes separately, avoiding the typical assumption 
that the elasticities of price transmission are the same weather farm prices rise or fall. 
The segmentation provides vital information about the relationship between the prices of 
two economic agents, i.e. farmer and retailer.  
Another important issue regarding the supply chain is how firms respond to 
unexpected events. For instance, agricultural and food firms tend to be highly integrated. 
With this integration and the sensitive degree of product management, safety becomes an 
important issue to be studied. A disease outbreak, for example, can generate high losses 
not only to the main party involved but also may affect other firms positioned in the 
same supply chain.  
Event study methodology aids investigation of how a particular event, such as a 
disease outbreak, affects the value of the firm as measured by stock market valuation. In 
addition, this methodology can be augmented to explore how these effects may be 
channeled to other firms along the supply chain. The application of the simple market 
model has been the conventional tool for economists to perform event studies.  
The market model utilizes the financial markets rationale, which states that the 
return and risk of a firm’s security are a function of the company’s performance relative 
to the market. Thus an unexpected event, such as a disease outbreak, may affect the 
stock of the firm and the ones linked to it along the supply chain. 
 Following the analysis of unexpected events, it is appropriate to compute not 
only the impact but also to analyze economically the cost of different control options to 
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mitigate an unexpected event. As mentioned, due to the high integration of agricultural 
markets and its importance to regional and national food businesses, a disease outbreak, 
for instance, will have disastrous consequences.  
Thus, applied economists must be trained to be able to interact with other 
scientists, such as veterinarians and epidemiologists, to incorporate into their studies into 
economic models that quantify the magnitudes of disease outbreaks and control 
strategies among them. In additions, an economist must be able to generate different 
scenarios under different circumstances, so policy makers can make better decisions.      
 The main objective of this dissertation is to address three important issues 
related to the supply chain: price transmission, the use of event study to analyze the 
economic impact of unexpected episodes and the spillovers in the industry and, finally, 
the development of a general conceptual economic model to analyze the impact of a 
disease along with the evaluation of different control options to mitigate a disease 
outbreak.   
This dissertation consists of three papers. The first paper (Chapter II) addresses 
the importance of testing for asymmetric price transmission. The conventional Houck 
approach is used and is extended to capture for time series cointegration. Then, the 
results are compared under the proposed von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy error correction 
model (ECM) approach. Moreover, the short- and long-run elasticities of price 
transmission between the farm and retail levels of the marketing channel for whole milk 
and two percent milk for seven US cities are calculated. Monthly data over the period 
from January 1994 to October 2002 are used.  
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 The second paper (Chapter III) uses the event study methodology to explore how 
one of the worst food disease outbreaks in the United States affected the main actors 
involved. The simple market model is used to perform the event study. In addition, this 
model is augmented in order to explore spillovers along the supply chain, as well as to 
check for volatility impacts.  
The third paper (Chapter IV) develops a general economic module that estimates 
the costs of a disease outbreak at the beginning of a supply chain. Also, this model 
compares quantitatively different control options to mitigate the disease. Then, this 
model uses a case study to analyze a hypothetical foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in the 
area of Panhandle, Texas. Finally, Chapter V summarizes the results of this dissertation 
and renders concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER II 
SPATIAL ASYMMETRY IN FARM-RETAIL PRICE TRANSMISSION 
ASSOCIATED WITH FLUID MILK PRODUCTS  
2.1 BACKGROUND 
Testing for asymmetric price transmission and calculating elasticities of price 
transmission are of great importance in applied economics. The relationship between 
farm and retail prices provides insights into marketing efficiency as well as consumer 
and producer welfare. Farm to retail price transmission elasticities are defined as the 
percentage change in the retail price of a product due to a one percent change in the 
corresponding farm price. As Aguiar and Santana (2002) pointed out, most empirical 
estimates of elasticities of price transmission have been obtained assuming symmetric 
price transmission, meaning that retail prices would respond in the same manner for both 
increases and decreases in farm prices. However, the literature is replete with evidence 
to indicate that asymmetric price transmission is very common. To illustrate, Peltzman 
(2000) found evidence of asymmetric price transmission in over two-thirds of his sample 
of hundred producer and consumer goods in the United States.  
Kinnucan and Forker (1987), Hahn (1990), and Bernard and Willett (1996) found 
that retail prices were more sensitive to increases in farm prices than to decreases in farm 
prices. Ward (1982) and Punyawadee, Boyd, and Faminow (1991), on the other hand, 
found that retail prices were more sensitive to decreases in farm prices than to increases 
in farm prices. Lass, Mawunyo and Goefrey (2001) found asymmetric speed of price 
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adjustment for fluid milk for Boston and Hartford during the operation of the Northeast 
Compact. Outside of agriculture, Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997) found that 
gasoline prices were more responsive to increases in oil prices than to decreases in oil 
prices. 
Importantly, while much of the empirical focus has been on methods to detect 
asymmetric price transmission, few analysts have actually computed the resulting 
elasticities of price transmission. This omission is curious because the computation of 
elasticities of price transmission is a natural by-product of the empirical analyses. 
Over the last three decades, most empirical efforts to test for the presence of 
asymmetric price transmission have been based on a variable-splitting technique 
developed by Wolffram (1971) and later adapted by Houck (1977) and Ward (1982). 
This technique has been employed in the agricultural economics literature in considering 
asymmetric price transmission. Examples include the examination of price asymmetry in 
spatial fed cattle markets by Bailey and Borsen (1989); price asymmetry in the US pork 
marketing channel by Boyd and Brorsen (1988) and Miller and Hayenga (2001) and in 
the Alberta pork market by Punyawadee, Boyd, and Faminow (1991); asymmetry in 
farm-retail price transmission in the dairy sector by Kinnucan and Forker (1987); price 
asymmetry in the international wheat market by Mohanty, Peterson, and Kruse (1995); 
price asymmetry in peanut butter by Zhang, Fletcher, and Carley (1995); asymmetric 
price relationships in the US broiler industry by Bernard and Willett (1996); price 
transmission asymmetry in pork and beef markets by Hahn (1990); asymmetry in 
shipping point, wholesale and retail markets for red delicious apples by Willett, 
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Hansmire, and Bernard (1997); asymmetry in beef, lamb and pork in farm-retail price 
transmission in Australia by Griffith and Piggott (1994) and asymmetry in farm to retail 
price transmission of fresh tomatoes, onions, powder milk, soluble coffee, rice, and 
beans in Brazil by Aguiar and Santana (2002).  
Von Cramon-Taubadel and Fahlbusch (1994) demonstrated that an asymmetric 
error correction model (ECM) based on the work of Granger and Lee (1989) could be 
used to test for asymmetric price transmission. Von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy (1999) 
extended this application of the asymmetric ECM and concluded that this method was 
more appropriate than the use of the conventional Houck approach if the price data 
under investigation were cointegrated. In this light, owing to the possibility that different 
methods employed to detect asymmetric price transmission may lead to different 
conclusions, a principal objective of this paper is to analyze the behavior of tests for 
asymmetry according to the conventional Houck approach and to the von Cramon-
Taubadel and Loy ECM approach. In this comparison, we employ monthly data over the 
period January 1994 to October 2002 pertaining to farm and retail prices of whole milk 
and two percent milk from seven US cities—Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, St. Louis, Seattle 
and two cities that belonged to the Northeast Dairy Compact: Boston and Hartford.1  
                                                 
1 The Northeast Dairy Compact was established by the Congress as an effort to restore the milk prices and 
assure its regional supply in six New England states. It operated from July 1997 to September 2001. 
Boston and Hartford enrich the analysis because this cities function under a different economic scenario, 
that is, in a less competitive market than the other five cities. As members of any compact, cities in the 
Northeast Compact were guaranteed a minimum price, which make operations less risky. Therefore, their 
production and marketing systems become very different than the producers that operate under more 
competitive markets. According to Godfrey (2001), the Northeast Compact was considered very 
successful because it was able to stabilize prices to milk producers and to increase revenues and 
production during its operation. For example, the price set in Boston was $16.94 per cwt and did not 
change during the compact’s existence.   
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The comparison of these approaches not only adds to the literature on price 
asymmetry but also potentially adds to the robustness of the results.  On the basis of this 
analysis, another principal objective is to estimate the elasticities of price transmission 
between the farm and retail levels of the marketing channel for whole milk and two 
percent milk by city and by model specification. 
2.2 METHODOLOGY 
In this section, an alternative approach for detecting asymmetric price 
transmission is presented.  We initially present and discuss the Houck approach and 
subsequently we present and discuss the asymmetric ECM approach.  These approaches 
are appropriate in examining the price transmission process between farm and 
wholesale, wholesale and retail, and farm and retail levels of the marketing channel.  The 
emphasis is placed on price transmission between the farm and retail levels of the 
vertical market system.  Additionally, while most previous studies center attention on 
asymmetric responses at the national level, relatively few address spatial considerations.  
Pick, Karrenbrock, and Carmen (1990) studied price asymmetry in the California and 
Arizona citrus industry; Bailey and Brorsen (1989) investigated price asymmetry in 
spatial fed cattle markets; and Willett, Hansmire, and Bernard (1987) look at asymmetric 
price response behavior of red delicious apples in the Western North Central and 
Northeastern regions of the United States. 
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2.2.1 The “Houck” approach 
Houck (1977) developed a test for asymmetric price transmission based on the 
segmentation of price variables into increasing and decreasing phases.  Many analysts 
followed suit; such as: Boyd and Brorsen (1988); Kinnucan and Forker (1987); Bailey 
and Brorsen (1989); Zhang, Fletcher, and Carley (1995); Mohanty, Peterson, and Kruse 
(1995); Bernard and Willett (1966); Willett, Hansmire, and Bernard (1997), Peltzman 
(2000); and Aguiar (2002).  Houck proposed a static asymmetric model that can be 
written as: 
 0 1 2P P P ,rt ft ft tα α α+ −∆ = + ∆ + ∆ +∈  (2.1) 
where Prt  and Pft  are retail and farm prices of the marketing chain, respectively, t = 1, 2, 
. . ., T, ∆  is the first difference operator, and following Houck (1977), 
1 1 1 1P P P ,if P P and 0 otherwise, and P P P ,if P < P and 0 otherwise.ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft ft
+ −
− − − −∆ = − > ∆ = −
 
Implicit in the development of this model is the notion that changes in farm prices are 
drivers of changes in retail prices.  To paraphrase Kinnucan and Forker (p. 286), “farm 
prices are assumed to Granger cause retail prices and not vice versa.”  Lamm and 
Westcott (1981) provided evidence that for dairy products the direction of causality did 
indeed run from the farm level to the retail level.  As shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, the 
Granger causality tests associated with the farm and retail prices of whole milk and two 
percent milk included in this analysis support the underlying assumption that farm prices 
precede or Granger cause retail prices. This support holds for all cities except Boston 
and Hartford, which is expected due to the price control scheme inherent in the 
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Northeast Dairy Compact result. This means that the pricing models can be set up with 
retail price as the dependent variable.2 
Because of:  (1) inertia in the food marketing system associated with storing, 
transporting, and processing fluid milk (Kinnucan and Forker 1987); (2) imperfections 
such as diversity in market structure and differences in the assimilation and transmission 
of information at exchange points in the market channel (Ward 1982); and (3) the nature 
of price reporting and collection methods (Hall et al 1981), the response of retail prices 
to changes in farm level prices generally is not instantaneous, but instead is distributed 
over time.  Lamm and Westcott (1981) noted that six months or less is required for retail 
dairy product prices to adjust fully to changes in the farm price of milk.  Consequently, 
equation (2.1), a static formulation, may be rewritten as a dynamic representation: 
 
1 2
0 1 2
0 0
P P P
M M
rt i ft i i ft i t
i i
α α α+ −− −
= =
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ +∈∑ ∑  (2.2) 
The 1iα coefficients in equation (2.2) represent the impact of rising farm prices on 
retail prices, and the 2iα coefficients in equation (2.2) represent the impact of falling 
farm prices on retail prices.  M1 and M2 represent the length of the lags with regard to 
rising farm prices and falling farm prices respectively.  As such, a formal test of the 
asymmetry hypothesis is: 
 
1 2
0 1 2
0 0
H :
M M
i i
i i
α α
= =
=∑ ∑  (2.3) 
                                                 
2 The Granger Causality test is simple, it consists of regressing a variable generally labeled x on lagged 
values of itself and lagged values of another variable, say y. If the latter is jointly significant, we say that y 
Granger causes x. This is, x is preceded by y.  
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The appropriate test statistic then is either a t-test or an F-test owing to the fact 
that the respective sums in equation (2.3) constitute a linear combination of coefficients.  
A rejection of H0 is evidence of asymmetry or non-reversibility in price transmission.  If 
one fails to reject H0, then there exists evidence to support the notion of symmetry (or 
reversibility) in price transmission. 
2.2.2 The “Asymmetric Error Correction Model” approach 
The literature dealing with price transmission for the most part has not paid 
proper attention to the time-series properties of the data (Goodwin and Holt 1999).  That 
is, with few exceptions, previous research, at least in the agricultural economics 
literature, has not considered the inherent nonstationarity of prices or long-run stationary 
equilibria (cointegration) relationships among prices.  This limitation was recognized by 
von Cramon-Taubel (1998) in investigating asymmetric price behavior in German 
producer and wholesale hog markets.  Goodwin and Holt (1999) evaluated price linkages 
among producers, wholesale, and retail marketing channels in US beef markets utilizing 
threshold cointegration methods introduced by Balke and Fomby (1997).  Similarly, 
Goodwin and Harper (2000) investigated linkages among farm, wholesale, and retail 
markets utilizing cointegration techniques in analyzing price transmission, threshold 
behavior, and asymmetric adjustment in the US pork sector.  Finally, Goodwin and 
Piggott (2001) evaluated linkages among four corn and four soybean markets in North 
Carolina using cointegration methods.  
The asymmetric ECM approach is motivated by the fact that none of the variants 
of the aforementioned Houck approach are not consistent with cointegration between the 
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retail and farm price series (von Cramon-Taubadel 1998; von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy 
1999).  If Prt and Pft  are cointegrated, then by the Engle-Granger Representation 
Theorem, we may develop an alternative specification for the price transmission process. 
Granger and Lee (1989) propose a modification to equation (2.4) that involves a 
Wolfram-type segmentation of the error correction term ECT into positive and negative 
components: 
 ∑∑
= −= −−
+∆+∆++∆+=∆ 21
1
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i
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i
irtitftrt vPPECTPP βββββ  (2.4) 
where ECTt = Prt – γ0 – γ1Pft (residuals from the cointegration relation between Prt and 
Pft). P1 and P2 represent the length of the lags associated with the change in retail series 
and the change in the farm price series.  
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Von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy (1999) made further modifications to this 
equation to allow for the segmentation of Pft∆ .  Consequently, the asymmetric error 
correction model in our analysis is given by: 
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Subsequently, we may rewrite and operationalize equation (2.6) as: 
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Notice that equation (2.7) is similar to the Houck approach given by equation 
(2.2), except for three additional terms:  
1P
2 1 2 1 3
1
ECT , ECT and Pt t i rt i
i
β β β+ + − −− − −
=
∆∑ .  Thus, the 
asymmetric ECM nests the Houck model.  If any of the coefficients 
2 2 3 1, , and ( 1,..., P )i iβ β β+ − = are statistically different from zero, then the asymmetric 
ECM is statistically superior to the Houck model.  A formal test of the asymmetry 
hypothesis using equation (2.7) is: 
 
32 PP
0 4 4 2 2
0 0
H :  and    i i
i i
β β β β+ − + −
= =
= =∑ ∑ (2.8) 
Again, because equation (2.8) involves a linear combination of structural 
coefficients, a joint F-test can be used to test the null hypothesis of symmetry in the price 
transmission process. 
2.2.3 Elasticities of price transmission  
We calculated the segmented elasticities of price transmission (EPT) for each 
market and product. The segmentation provides vital information about the relationship 
between retail and farm prices and the structure of the market. They measure the 
percentage change in the retail price of a commodity due to a one percent change in farm 
price. The elasticity of price transmission is segmented in order to capture the positive 
and negative changes separately.    
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The positive elasticity of price transmission (PEPT) is equal to: 
 PEPT= α1 * (Pft/Prt) | ∆Pft > 0 (2.9) 
The negative elasticity of price transmission (NEPT) is equal to: 
 NEPT= α2 * (Pft/Prt) | ∆Pft < 0 (2.10) 
The responsive elasticities correspond to the means of all observations for which ∆Pft > 0 
and for which ∆Pft < 0; where α1 and α2 are the coefficients estimated in either equation 
(2.2) or (2.7), depending on the approach used (Houck or ECM). Emphasis on the 
segmentation allows businesses and firms to make better decisions on regarding pricing.   
2.3. DATA  
Monthly nominal retail prices of two percent and whole milk and undeflated 
announced cooperative (farm level) blend prices for milk from seven U.S. cities for the 
period January 1994 to October 2002 were used. To create a farm price for whole milk 
and a farm price for two percent milk, adjustments to the cooperative blend price were 
made based on butterfat and components.3  Our analysis was conducted using 106 
monthly observations.  Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Hartford, Seattle, and St. Louis 
were chosen to represent different regions of the country to achieve geographic 
diversity; Boston and Hartford were also chosen because they belong to the Northeast 
Compact.  Descriptive statistics associated with these respective price series are 
exhibited in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.  The farm and retail prices are expressed in terms of 
                                                 
3 We are grateful to Bud Schwart, Extension Dairy Economist at Texas A&M University, for 
making these adjustments to the blend price. 
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dollars per gallon. The source of the data is the Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. 
Average farm prices of whole milk range from $1.28 per gallon (Seattle) to $1.46 
per gallon (Boston).  Average retail prices of whole milk range from $2.63 per gallon 
(Dallas) to $3.29 per gallon (Seattle).  Similar figures are evident for average farm and 
retail prices of two percent milk across these seven U.S. cities.  Suffice it to say that 
noteworthy differences exist in prices, both at the farm and retail levels, for the seven 
cities.  In short, differences in farm and retail prices, as well as in farm-retail price 
spreads by city, are likely the results of government policy and the cost of transporting 
fluid milk from surplus to deficit areas.   
The next step is check on the cointegration between the respective farm price and 
retail price series.4  In Tables 2.5 and 2.6, we summarize the Johansen cointegration 
tests.  Based on both the Trace test and the Maximal Eigenvalue test statistics, farm 
prices and retail prices of whole milk are cointegrated for the cities of Atlanta, Chicago, 
and Dallas.  Farm prices and retail prices of two percent milk are cointegrated for all 
cities except Boston and Hartford. Consequently, in order to capture the long term 
relationship for the respective cointegrated series, we apply the asymmetric ECM, which 
is more robust than the Houck approach. 
Again, we speculate that the lack of cointegration of farm and retail prices in 
Boston and Hartford may be attributed to the institution of the Northeast Compact.  
                                                 
4 The Johansen Test (Johansen and Joselius 1990 and Johansen 1995) is conducted in two steps. 
First, the Augmented Dickey Fuller is used to check for stationary properties of the series. 
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Bailey (2003) found that retail prices were higher by roughly 30 to 31 cents per gallon in 
these cities when the Northeast Compact was in effect compared to when it was not.  
Also, Bailey (2003) found that the farm-to-retail price spread was higher during the 
presence of the Northeast Compact. 
2.4 ESTIMATION PROCEDURES 
To accommodate the Houck approach, we estimate equation (2.2) for the milk 
products and the seven representative cities.  Similarly, we estimate equation (2.7) to 
accommodate the ECM approach for those cities with cointegrated prices.  Except for 
Boston and Hartford, roughly 40 (60) percent of the observations are for decreases 
(increases) in farm prices.  In the cases of Boston and Hartford, the observations are 
roughly evenly split for decreases in farm prices and for increases in farm prices.  Thus 
from a statistical standpoint, a sufficient number of observations exist to reliably assess 
the asymmetry issue. 
In some of the equations, serial correlation is evident; therefore, for these 
equations, generalized least squares estimates are presented.  In those equations in which 
serial correlation is not evident, we present ordinary least squares estimates.  Lag 
structures associated with the Houck approach and the ECM approach were estimated 
using the Almon procedure.  Lag structures were assumed to lie on a second order 
polynomial.  Endpoint restrictions were used in conjunction with the Almon procedure.  
The length of the distributed lag process was determined based on the Akaike 
                                                                                                                                                
Second, for those series that were integrated of the same order, we use the Johansen test to check 
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Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC). The level of 
significance for this analysis is the 0.05 level.  
2.5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The estimated coefficients and their estimated p-values associated with the 
Houck approach and the ECM approach for whole milk and for two percent milk for 
each of the seven cities are exhibited in Tables 2.7-2.11.5  Estimated coefficients in most 
cases are statistically different from zero and are in accord with a priori expectations.  
For the equations corresponding to the Houck approach, the goodness-of-fit statistics 
range from 0.1682 to 0.4342, and for the equations corresponding to the ECM approach, 
the goodness-of-fit statistics range from 0.20 to 0.47.  The relatively low magnitudes of 
these R2 statistics are attributable to the fact that the dependent variables correspond to 
changes in retail prices. 
With the Houck approach, the number of lags associated with rising farm price 
variables typically is one, except in the cases of Seattle (whole milk and two percent 
milk), Dallas (two percent milk), and St. Louis (two percent milk.)  The number of lags 
associated with declining farm price variables also is generally one, except in the cases 
of Chicago (whole milk) and Dallas (whole milk and two percent milk.)  This finding 
indicates, in contrast to Kinnucan and Forker, that the time for milk prices at the retail 
level to adjust to either increases or decreases in milk prices at the farm level is roughly 
the same. 
                                                                                                                                                
for cointegration. 
5 Variable definitions are exhibited in Table 2.7  
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However, when using the ECM approach, our results are in agreement with 
Kinnucan and Forker; milk prices at the retail level adjust more slowly to decreases in 
milk prices at the farm level, with the exceptions of Dallas (two percent milk) and 
Seattle (two percent milk).  The lag associated with rising farm price variables is 
between one and three months, most commonly one month.  The lag associated with 
declining farm price variables is between one and six months, most commonly two 
months. 
With the Houck approach and the ECM approach, the long-run effect on retail 
milk prices attributable to increases in farm milk prices exceeds the cumulative effect 
attributable to decreases in farm milk prices.  The only exceptions are in the cases of 
milk prices in Dallas and St. Louis.  The F-test associated with the null hypothesis that 
retail prices respond symmetrically to increases and decreases in farm prices (equation 
3) is rejected with the Houck approach in all cases except for St. Louis.  With the ECM 
approach, the hypothesis of symmetry in price transmission (equation 8) is rejected in all 
cases. 
Additionally, we are in a position to determine whether or not the error 
correction model is statistically superior to the Houck model.  We consider the joint 
significance of B2+, B2-, and B3i (i=1, . . . P1) in equation (2.7).  The F-statistic is the 
basis of this test, assuming the lag structures are the same for and . ft ftP P
+ −∆ ∆ If the lag 
structures are not the same, then one may use either the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) or Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) to make the statistical comparison 
between model specifications.  For whole milk, the Houck model and the error 
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correction model are statistically equivalent.  For two percent milk, the same inference 
holds for Atlanta, Chicago, and Dallas.  However, for Seattle and St. Louis, in the case 
of two percent milk, the error correction model is statistically superior to the Houck 
model, since ECM captures the long term relationship between farm and retail prices.  
Short- and long-run elasticities of price transmission, evaluated at the sample 
means of the data, are exhibited in Tables 2.12-2.15 for rising and falling farm prices.  
All estimated elasticities of price transmission are less than the elasticity of price 
transmission of 0.9375 reported by George and King (1971).  The long-run elasticities of 
price transmission are at least twice as large as the corresponding short run elasticities of 
price transmission.  This result holds for both increases and decreases in prices at the 
farm level.  For rising farm prices of milk, the elasticities of price transmission vary 
from 0.037 to 0.263 in the short-run and from 0.187 to 0.527 in the long-run.  For falling 
farm prices of milk, the elasticities of price transmission vary from 0.005 to 0.166 in the 
short-run and from 0.031 to 0.553 in the long-run.  Kinnucan and Forker (1987) reported 
the elasticity of price transmission for rising farm prices of milk to be 0.274 in the short- 
run and 0.462 in the long-run.  For falling prices of milk, they found the elasticity of 
price transmission to be 0.184 for the short-run and 0.330 for the long-run.  Their short- 
run elasticities of price transmission are outside our intervals, but their long-run 
elasticities of price transmission are within our intervals.  
Except for Dallas (whole milk and two percent milk) and St. Louis (two percent 
milk), elasticities of price transmission are greater for rising farm prices then for falling 
price prices.  Thus, in most regions, consistent with Kinnucan and Forker (1987), 
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increases in the farm price of milk are passed through to the retail level more fully than 
are decreases in the farm price of milk.   
2.6 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
We analyze the behavior of spatial tests of asymmetric price transmission 
according to the conventional Houck approach and to the von Cramon-Taubadel and 
Loy ECM approach.  Empirical results suggest that the farm-retail price transmission 
process for milk is asymmetric.  This result holds true for each of the seven cities 
considered in our analysis.  In most cases, the Houck approach and the ECM approach, 
(where applicable) are statistically indistinguishable.  The exceptions are two percent 
milk for Seattle and St. Louis.  With the ECM approach, milk prices at the retail level 
adjust more slowly to decreases in milk prices and more quickly to increases in milk 
prices at the farm level.  This conclusion is not supported by the Houck approach.  In 
most cases, price transmission elasticities for rising farm prices are generally larger than 
corresponding elasticities associated with falling farm prices for both the Houck 
approach and the ECM approach.  The short-run elasticities of price transmission for 
milk products are smaller in magnitude compared to those reported in the literature.  The 
long-run elasticities of price transmission are consistent with those reported in the 
literature. 
However, one of the main limitations of this research is the assumption that there 
are no intermediaries between the farmer and the retailer. There is a possibility that some 
other agents are generating the rigidity of price transmission.  
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Having asymmetric price transmission means that social welfare is not being 
maximized. For example, when farm prices are going down, consumers should benefit 
from it. However, our results indicate that they are not because retailers do not respond 
to farm price reductions in the same way as they do to farm price increases. Retailers are 
taking some of the surplus from consumers, thereby diminishing the maximization of 
their surplus and thus the social welfare. Under this scenario, policies may be needed to 
correct this market failure and to assure that consumers are not harmed by non 
competitive market practices.  
We recommend that in future studies of asymmetry and elasticities of price 
transmission that:  (1) consideration be given to the ECM approach in addition to the 
conventional Houck approach; and (2) the analysis be conducted on a spatial basis, 
either by city or region in lieu of a national analysis.  Our empirical results suggest that 
differences in inferences not only are possible but also in fact do occur by geographical 
area.  
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CHAPTER III 
STOCK MARKET REACTION TO A PARTICULAR DISEASE  
OUTBREAK: AN EMPIRICAL APPLICATION FOR AN EVENT  
STUDY IN THE FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN 
3.1 BACKGROUND 
Today, agricultural firms have more opportunities to reach and interact with 
foreign markets. In the case of the food industry, market integration and product 
diversity bring new challenges, such as product safety. This is an important issue for 
economists to address. Firms will implement safety practices if the benefits of doing it 
are higher than the costs. This is, if businesses expect higher profits from their products 
or reduce the risk of an outbreak through the adoption of safety practices, they will have 
incentives to implement them.  
Economists are qualified to answer questions such as: what is the optimal level of 
safety a firm should adopt? What are the incentives for private and public safety? What 
is the economic impact when safety goes wrong? What is the impact throughout the 
supply chain? And, what are the most cost effective measures for recovery after existing 
safety measures have failed?  
In order to address some of these questions, economists have been developing 
different tools. For example, event study methodology aids in evaluating how 
unexpected events, such as changes in safety patterns, impact the value of the firm. 
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These event studies consist of evaluating the economic impact of a particular episode on 
the value of the firm, which is reflected in the rate of return of the firm’s stock.  
A publicly traded company is not only interested in maximizing the wealth of its 
investors but also in minimizing their risk. Thus, this paper extends the traditional 
methodology to study how a particular event affects risk to the firm and if there are 
spillover effects on the industry.  
This chapter relies on the foundation of the event study methodology to explore 
how one of the worst food disease outbreaks in the United States affected the main 
players involved. Studying this outbreak is important to understand how markets and 
economic agents react to unexpected disease outbreaks in the agriculture and food 
industry. The event explored here involves some of the most important firms in these 
sectors.  
This chapter is divided into several sections. First, an extensive literature review 
is presented. This section covers previous theoretical and empirical studies that provide 
the best available methodology for this work. Second, the event study is described. 
Third, the simple market model used to calculate and test for abnormal rates of returns 
for the companies involved in the outbreak is developed. In addition, a GARCH model is 
applied to the simple market model to account for time-varying volatility. Then, a 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) is built to check for spillover along the supply 
chain. This technique is used to capture the impact on other firms after the outbreak. 
Finally, conclusions are presented.  
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3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Extensive economic and financial literature on event studies exists. Although 
MacKinlay (1997) reported that the first published work on this topic was the paper by 
Dolley (1933), perhaps Sharpe (1964) has made the most important contribution to event 
study literature. Sharpe (1964) used the previous work of Markowitz (1959) to provide 
the first aggregate market model that could be used under conditions of risk. The 
application of the simple market model became the conventional tool for economists to 
perform event studies.  
The simple market model captures one of the main rationales regarding financial 
markets: the value and risk of a firm’s security are a function of the company’s market 
performance. Thus, the simple market model aids in calculating how a relevant event 
related to a company affects the value and risk of its stock.  
Most of the literature on event studies relies on the same structure and 
methodology. It is the econometric technique and data periodicity that varies among 
papers. MacKinlay (1997) summarized different methods for performing event studies 
and provided different procedures to conduct an event study. Two points of importance 
are derived by MacKinlay (1997): one, the clear definition and understanding of the 
event, and, two, the correct use of data. Brown and Warner (1985) and MacKinlay 
(1997) discussed the performance of different frequencies of observations. Particularly, 
Brown and Weinstein (1985) showed that using daily rates of return provides more 
robust results compared to less frequent data, such as quarterly rates. They argued that 
daily frequencies carry more information. However, researchers must be aware of certain 
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difficulties, such as autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. MacKinlay (1997) suggested 
that when testing for abnormal returns using the market model, it is better to use daily 
frequencies and a sample which spans from over 120 days before the day of the event to 
twenty days or more after the event. As an illustration, MacKinlay (1997) used the 
simple market model to evaluate quarterly earnings announcements for 30 firms in the 
Dow Jones Industrial Index from 1989 to 1993. MacKinlay calculated abnormal rates of 
returns due to the announcements for each of the firms. Abnormal return is the 
difference between ex post observed return of the security minus the expected return 
prior to the event.   
Another important contribution to the literature was made by Binder (1998), who 
elaborated a detailed event study methodology since 1969. In his work, he discussed 
different methods for calculating abnormal rates of returns along with other statistical 
problems, such as heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, which generate yield 
inefficient and invalid statistical inferences on the systematic risk’s estimated 
coefficients.  
Event studies have been applied in a wide variety of industries. To illustrate, 
Marcus et al (1987) studied the impact of drug recalls on that firm’s stock value. They 
found that drug recalls had a more severe negative effect on the stock value of the firm 
than did the direct cost borne by the firm. Chugh et al (1978) examined how the air and 
water pollution control legislation (1953-75) directly affected the financial risks and 
costs of chemical, electric utilities, iron and steel, petroleum, and textile industries. They 
found that companies have higher risks and a higher break-even point due to higher 
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environmental standards. Ries (1993) analyzed the impact of the voluntary export 
restraint agreement (VER) on Japanese automobile stock prices. Andersen et al (2003) 
analyzed how the exchange rates adjust to news. They found that conditional means of 
US dollar exchange rates adjust to news faster than the conditional variance. 
In addition, different econometric techniques have evolved over time for 
conducting event studies. For example, Corhay and Tournaid (1996) introduced a 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) within the market 
model to capture time-varying volatility and used it to estimate abnormal rates of 
returns. Their event study analyzed divestitures of Dutch firms. They used 140 
observations prior to the event and 20 after, which is consistent with the event interval 
used in MacKinlay (1997). Corhay et al (1996) found that using OLS versus GARCH 
leads to different results and different interpretations. A similar approach is performed 
by Wang et al (2002) who incorporated a multivariate GARCH technique to account for 
time-varying volatility for an event study related to food contamination recalls between 
two firms positioned at the same point in the supply chain. On the same token, Salin and 
Hooker (2001) studied how time varying volatility of the firm changes due to food 
recalls. They use two approaches to analyze volatility: first, they use the standard 
deviation of daily returns, and, second, they computed a daily price spread and 
normalized it over daily opening stock prices to capture price movements within the day. 
In that particular study, they found that the events did not generate volatility in all cases. 
However, they did find that food recalls affected the value of the firms.  
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Thompson (1985) developed a system of equations to capture the 
interrelationship among securities under an event study. The structure he used is 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). His paper contains a detailed description of 
the structure of the system and the technique to estimate and test the hypotheses of 
significance for the parameters. da Graca (unpublished dissertation,  2002) suggested 
that using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) is more powerful than using Ordinary Least 
Squares because GLS technique will generate more efficient coefficients. In his event 
study on Brazilian privatization auction events, he finds different results between 
conducting OLS and GLS. However, this might not be true under a system of equations. 
Thompson (1985) argues that although there are some benefits under GLS in an event 
study, there are problems if the covariance matrix of the error is not known.  If the error 
is estimated, it is not clear if using GLS is advantageous. Thus, Thompson (1985) 
contradicts the conclusions of da Graca (2002), who strongly suggests the use of the 
GLS approach. However, if the correct variance-covariance matrix of the error is known, 
GLS will produce more efficient estimated parameters. 
There are other methodologies suggested in the literature. For example, Kramer 
(2001) proposed an alternative method for performing event studies using nonparametric 
econometrics, which for this case consists of normalizing the data through bootstrap re-
sampling. She suggested this method would improve results since in some cases time 
series data does not maintain a normal distribution. In this same context, some other 
authors, such as Marais (1984), use bootstrap techniques in event studies. Cable and 
Holland (1999), along with Larsen and Resnick (1999), showed that under the simple 
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market model, regression derives better results than those produced by non-regression 
techniques. 
Although, there is extensive literature on empirical applications of the market 
model, there are some topics which have either not been covered well enough or not at 
all. For example, the use of the market model to analyze spillovers along the supply 
chain has not been reported. In addition, we believe that more research on the market 
model and volatility needs to be done.  
3.3 METHODOLOGY 
3.3.1 The simple market model and abnormal returns 
The daily rate of return on a stock is an indicator of the relative change in the 
market value of a publicly traded company. The firm’s value changes over time, 
depending on the company performance. Investors use the media as one of the most 
important sources of monitoring this performance. Quarterly earnings, acquisitions, 
alliances, dividends, new technologies, and good and bad events reported by the media 
are used by investors to decide how much of a company’s stock they will buy or sell, 
determining the stock market price of a particular firm.  
Sharpe (1964), who followed the work of Markowitz (1959), was the first to 
develop a market model of equilibrium asset prices under conditions of risk. The simple 
market model illustrates that expected return from asset i is a function of the return of 
the market portfolio. MacKinlay (1997) expressed the market model for company i as 
follows:  
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where itr  is the rate of return of company i in time t. The variable mtr  is the rate of 
return of a well diversified portfolio, called m. 0β  is a constant and 1β  measures the 
systematic risk of firm i, compared with portfolio m. For example, if 1β is equal to one, 
it means that stock i is as risky as portfolio m. If 1β is bigger than one, it means that 
stock i is riskier than m and if 1β is less than one, it means that portfolio i is less risky 
than m. Finally, ε  is the error term.  
The simple market model in (3.1) analyzes the statistical relationship between the 
return of a company’s stock and the return of the market portfolio. MacKinlay (1997) 
affirms that the market model linear specification is due to the assumed joint normality 
of the assets return. Although prices are not stationary, returns are expected to be 
stationary in financial theory, which allows for their forecasts.   
The simple market model provides the foundation to test for abnormal returns 
generated by the unexpected event. Estimating equation (3.1) allows a forecast of the 
return itr , h periods ahead.  According to MacKinlay (1997), this prediction is crucial to 
analyze the event study.  He defines an abnormal return as the actual ex post return of 
security i, considering the event minus the normal return of i; which is equal to the return 
one period ahead without considering the event. This abnormal rate of return (ARi,t+e) is 
the difference between the post event return etir +,  and the forecast rate of return )( , etir +
∧
:  
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Technically, an abnormal return is defined as the after event return etir +, that falls 
out of the confidence interval (CI), calculated from the forecast rate of return 
)( , etir +
∧
estimated prior to the event. 
 )( ,, ticveti rsetrCI ×±= +
∧
 (3.3) 
where tcv is the critical value, )( ,tirse is the standard error of the entire pre-event period 
regression.  
3.3.2 The market model and volatility 
Analyzing time varying volatility is important in the study of financial markets. 
The simple market model can be extended to analyze the volatility originating in the 
series due to an outbreak. If the volatility of the return increases after an unexpected 
event, investors would expect higher rates of return as a compensation for holding a 
risky asset. A common technique to analyze volatility was developed by Engle (1982). 
In his paper, he proposed a model with a stochastic process called autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) which allows the use of recent past information 
to forecast the variance one period ahead. Moreover, Bollerslev (1986) developed an 
econometric model that captures the previous variance to build the current conditional 
variance equation. This generalization of the ARCH model is known as a Generalized 
ARCH or GARCH model, which consists of a mean and conditional variance equation. 
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Corhay et al. (1996) and Wang et al. (2002) use a market model which uses 
GARCH to account for time varying volatility effects. Wang et al. (2002) argue that this 
econometric technique provides important information about the level of return and its 
variance at the same time. The market model should be adjusted for GARCH effects 
when the residuals of equation (3.1) are heteroskedastic. This is because recent past 
errors may give information on the conditional variance since it is based on past 
information.  
Thus the GARCH (p,q) specification for the market model is:  
 itmtiiit rCr εβ ++= , where  (3.4) 
 )hN(0,~| it,tiit ψε , and  (3.4’) 
 ∑ ∑
− = −−
++= q
k
p
j
jtiijhtiikiit hh
1 1
,
2
,0 θεαα .  (3.5) 
Equations (3.4) and (3.5) are the mean and variance equations, respectively. The 
mean equation is expressed as a function of the exogenous variables and an error term 
itε . Equation (3.4’) contains the information set ti,ψ  at time t for firm i. Equation (3.5) 
is called the conditional variance equation, since ith  is conditional based on past 
information. The variable 2, hti −ε  captures volatility from previous periods. N is the 
distribution of the residuals and with p > 0; αik>=0, i=0,…p; q>0; bij >= 0, j=0,…q.  
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3.3.3 The simple market model and spillovers in the market 
The methods described to this point are used to identify the effect of an event on 
a single firm’s return. It is also of interest to analyze spillovers across the industry 
related to this event. Within a market, there are producers, sellers, and consumers; it is 
important to see how an event passes through these economic agents. Specifically, we 
explore how an event that involves firm i is affecting firm j and others. Thus, it is useful 
to develop a system of equations to capture contemporaneous correlation that may lead 
us to find spillovers. An extension of the simple market model (3.1) is performed to 
capture interrelated information from one security to another using a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique. The parameters capture the correlation of 
residuals among companies in the same industry.   
Thompson (1985) performs a system of equations of an event study to take into 
account spillovers through an aggregation of the basic market model, where equation 
(3.1) is rewritten in matrix notation as follows: 
 EZR +Γ=   (3.6) 
where 










=×
j
nj
R
R
R
.
.
1
1)(  







=×
j
jnj
Z
Z
Z
Z
...........0
........0
0........
2
1
3)(  
[ ] 31,,1 ×= njmj DRZ  
  
34
















=Γ ×
j
j
j
j
γ
β
α
γ
β
α
.
.
.
1
1
1
)13(








=×
j
nj
e
e
E
.
.
1
)1(  
where an underscore indicates a vector and an over score indicates a matrix. R  is a 
column vector that contains j blocks with the daily rates of return (Rj) for each of the j 
companies in the model; n is the number of observations for each of the j companies. Rj 
is a vector of (n x 1). Z  is a block diagonal matrix that contains the blocks ( jZ ) of 
dependent variables: the intercept 1, the rate of return of the well diversified portfolio 
(Rm) and the binary variable with the announcement dates ( jD ). Each of these vectors is 
(n x 1). Γ  is the column vector which contains the coefficients for the dependent 
variables and E is the error column vector. Thompson (1985) suggests specifying this 
model as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR), treating each equation separately and 
specifying each using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). His paper argues that OLS, in 
comparison to GLS, is less efficient when the variance covariance matrix is known. 
However, if it is not known, it is not clear whether using GLS provides any advantage. 
For the particular case of our study, the SUR was simultaneously estimated to capture 
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the contemporaneous correlation of the disturbances among equations, in order to obtain  
associations among firms, if any exist.   
3.4 DESCRIPTION AND CHRONOLOGY OF THE EVENT CASE STUDY  
The particular event study performed in this work deals with one of the worst 
outbreaks of foodborne diseases in the United States and its impact on the value of the 
firms that were involved in the unexpected episode. There are two main companies 
involved in this outbreak: Prandium and Sysco.  
Prandium was founded in 1999 after a merger between Koo Koo Roo, Inc. and 
Family Restaurants, Inc. Prandium was the holder of the largest Mexican chain 
restaurants in the US: Chi-Chi’s.  
On the other hand, Sysco is one of the largest food distributors to the foodservice 
industry. Sysco’s products and services are distributed to more than 390,000 customers, 
including Chi-Chi’s.  
These companies are positioned in different places along the supply chain. Sysco, 
as a food distributor company, is placed one step before Prandium, the restaurant holder, 
in the supply chain.   
The chronology of this event is as follows: on November 3, 2003, the Associated 
Press reported a hepatitis advisory to all people who ate at Chi-Chi’s restaurant in 
Beaver Valley, Pennsylvania, between October 22 and November 2. At that time, Chi-
Chi’s was heading for auction with more than $100 million in debt and had already filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the US Bankruptcy Court in Delaware on October 8, 2003.  
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The Associated Press and the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reported the evolution of 
the event. When the State Department of Health issued the public notice, at least 12 
restaurant workers and 10 consumers were infected. By November 7, only a few days 
later, the number of cases had risen to 130, the first customer died, and one more needed 
a liver transplant. Individual law suits started to rise to almost 40 through Marler Clark, a 
law firm specializing in representing victims of foodborne illness (marlerclark.com). 
Marler Clark filed a class action lawsuit against Chi Chi’s on behalf of over 9,000 
people who were forced to receive Immune Globulin injections to prevent infection with 
hepatitis A after being exposed to the virus at Chi-Chi’s. 
By November 11, the number of cases had risen to 300, which is above the 
average number of Hepatitis A cases in a restaurant outbreak reported by the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention. By November 19, the number of cases was more than 
500 and three people had died. On this date, the United States Department of Agriculture 
banned the importation of Mexican green onions due to the suspicion that the onions had 
caused the hepatitis outbreak. 
As a precautionary measure and to assure the safety and trade of Mexican 
products, the Mexican government closed four green onion farms until an investigation 
was completed (Calvin et al 2004). On November 21, the Reforma newspaper in Mexico 
published an interview with Baja California agriculture officials speaking out in defense 
of the growers. They said that no evidence linked any of the four farms to the outbreaks 
that had infected more than 500 people and killed three who ate raw green onions served 
in salsa at a Chi-Chi's restaurant in Pennsylvania.  
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However, according to Thomas (2003), by November 27 the accusations against 
the Mexican onions had neither been proven nor confirmed by experts; this made the 
Mexican government and producers upset about being blamed as the source of the 
outbreak. In an article published on November 28, 2003 in Periódico Reforma, the 
governor of Baja California, Eugenio Elorduy, started to speak out on behalf of the 
onion producers located in that state. Governor Elorduy rejected the attitude of the US 
government. He welcomed all American inspectors to come to Mexico to review the 
evidence since he was confident that the growers had used the right procedures to 
produce the onions. 
By the middle of December, a dispute between the Mexican and US Government 
erupted. On December 11, 2003, there was an article in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette by 
Christopher Snowbeck arguing that Mexican and US authorities had been sending 
confusing signals to the market. The Mexican authorities denied that the source of the 
outbreak originated in Mexico, claiming that it was due to mishandling and storing by 
Chi-Chi’s, and the US authorities were blaming Mexico without evidence. 
On December 15, an article in the San Diego Union-Tribune written by staff 
members Diane Lindquist and Sandra Dibble raised the possibility that the outbreak 
originated in Mexico, but they acknowledge that this was impossible to confirm. Jack 
Guzewich of the US Food and Drug Administration said that investigators may never 
know the origin of the outbreak for certain. This further upset the Mexican authorities, 
who accused the FDA of negatively affecting the image of Mexican products by pointing 
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to Mexican farmers while admitting they had no real evidence to back up their claims 
about the source of the outbreak.  
Finally, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reported that the event sickened around 660 
people and killed four. After the FDA failed to find evidence that the Mexican growers 
were the source of contamination, Chi-Chi’s went after the suppliers: Sysco and 
Castellini, encouraging them to help pay part of the cost. However, since neither of these 
companies wanted to pay for it, Chi-Chi’s proceeded to sue them late in July of 2004 
through Gordon’s law firm. There are no public records which show the exact date of the 
trial. The first public document on this lawsuit was published on August 3, 2004, by the 
Associated Press and released by several newspapers. Each of these articles only 
mentions that the lawsuit took place sometime at the end of July. After an intense 
investigation, it was not possible to find a document with the date of the trial. According 
to our investigation, it is likely that the parties settled the dispute outside the court room.  
3.5 DATA 
All of the data came from Yahoo® Finance Services. Rates of returns were 
computed for each company. The frequency was daily and expressed in decimal 
changes.  The S&P 500 was used as a proxy for a well diversified market portfolio 
return. We followed MacKinlay (1997) to establish the data range: 120 observations 
prior to the event and 20 after.  
The event study for this work has two major episodes: first, when Prandium, 
holder of Chi-Chi’s, was publicly implicated in the outbreak on November 3, 2003; 
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second, when the Associated Press reported that Prandium had sued Sysco on August 3, 
2004.    
Thus, there are two sets of data: one for the event of November 3, 2003, in which 
Prandium was involved. The other data set corresponds to the notice that appeared on 
August 3, 2004, in which Sysco was involved. Descriptive statistics associated with 
these respective price series are exhibited in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Related graphs for each 
series of returns are displayed in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.  
It is important to note that Prandium data presents the highest standard deviation 
among all securities. The riskiness of Prandium and its financial problems caused this 
company’s daily returns to fluctuate from -38.82 to 282.35 percent, as it is shown in 
Table 3.2 and Figure 3.1. In addition, the riskiness of Pradium is shown in Figure 3.1, 
where Prandium’s rates of return oscillate highly compared to the S&P 500. 
On the other hand, Sysco presents a small standard deviation, which reflects a 
very low level of risk. Sysco’s rates of return move somewhat close to the S&P 500, as 
can be observed in Figure 3.2. 
Finally, one additional set of data is considered to estimate spillovers of one 
firm’s safety breach on its industry. The firms considered for this multivariate system are 
publicly traded firms that are competitors with Sysco and Prandium. This allowed us to 
incorporate a diversity of firms positioned in different locations along the supply chain; 
some closer to the final consumers than others.   
The following firms were considered Sysco’s clients and Prandium’s 
competitors: Brinker International Inc. (EAT) that owns and operates Chili’s Grill and 
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Bar, Romano’s Macaroni Grill and On the Border Mexican Grill. Darden Restaurants 
Inc. (DRI) runs Red Lobster and the Olive Garden, among other restaurants. Outback 
Steakhouse Inc. (OSI) owns and manages Outback restaurants. Finally, Applebee’s 
International Incorporated (APPB) owns and operates Applebee’s Restaurants.  
The following were considered competitors for Sysco:  Performance Food Group 
Company (PFGC), Aramark (RMK), Ahold (AHO), which is the parent company of US 
Food Service Inc. and Supervalu Foods Inc. (SUV). These companies, including Sysco, 
share the majority of the American market in food distribution.6  
3.6 ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
The first procedure was to estimate the simple market model for Prandium and 
then for Sysco.  
3.6.1 Simple market model for Prandium  
As described in Section 3.2, the first announcement that involved Prandium was 
published on the 4th of November, 2003, the day that the Associated Press issued the first 
public note regarding a hepatitis contamination at Chi-Chi’s. Using MacKinlay (1997) 
methodology, 120 observations are used to estimate the pre-event simple market model 
for Prandium.  
The results are shown in Table 3.3. The Beta coefficient is 1.502. Although it is 
not statistically significant, the magnitude and sign of the coefficient makes sense and 
corresponds to what it is observed in Figure 3.1. Prandium is more volatile than the 
                                                 
6 For detailed information on these firms, please see Appendix B, pp. 110. 
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S&P. That is, Prandium stock is riskier than a well diversified portfolio. Due to the 
catastrophic financial situation of Prandium, related to its bankruptcy mentioned in 
Section 3.4, the rates of returns of this company were unable to generate the results 
needed to do any further market analysis.  
The next step is to study the other major player involved in the outbreak: Sysco,  
Prandium’s supplier.  
3.6.2 The augmented market model for Sysco  
For Sysco, the event day is August 3, 2004, the day that the press announced that 
Prandium intended to sue its supplier. In order to study Sysco, the simple market model 
was augmented by adding some binary variables, to capture some company specific 
announcements, such as quarterly earnings reports and acquisitions. Thus the augmented 
market model for Sysco is: 
 tttmtt DDrr εββββ ++++= 231210   (3.7) 
The first binary variable (D1) has a value of 1 on the day Sysco announced 
quarterly reports, sales records, and dividends; D1 is 0 for all other days in the period. D2 
takes the value of 1 the day that Sysco completed and reported asset acquisitions and is 0 
elsewhere. The reason for having two dummy variables is that the expected signs for the 
coefficients are different.  Quarterly reports, sales records and dividends are expected to 
be positively correlated to tr , while acquisitions are expected to be negatively 
correlated. The announcements are reported in Figure 3.2. The White test was used to 
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test for heteroskedasticity; the results are reported in Table 3.4. The null hypothesis of 
no heteroskedasticity fails to be rejected. Thus, equation (3.7) can be estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares; the results are reported in Table 3.3.  
The results presented in Table 3.3 show a significant β1, which is the systematic 
risk of Sysco. The magnitude of this coefficient is 0.573. Since this is less than one, this 
means that the stock of this company is less risky than the market portfolio.7 
Also, the signs of the coefficients for D1 and D2 are what we were expecting. For 
example, the positive sign of the coefficient D1 indicates that the daily rates of returns 
moved in the same direction as the quarterly and dividend reports. This is, when there 
are announcements on dividends going up, the rate of return goes up as well. On the 
other hand, the sign of D2 is negative as expected. This is because the company is 
increasing the costs in the short term by acquiring assets, thus short term investors lose 
incentives to invest in the company because it will take time to generate profits.   
In order to calculate and test the significance of Sysco’s abnormal rates of return 
associated with the public announcement of the lawsuit, results from equation (3.7) were 
used to compute equations (3.2) and (3.3). In order to compute the abnormal rate of 
return for the event day, we use the pre event day’s rate of return (August 2, 2004) to 
forecast one period ahead the rate of return )( , etir +
∧
. Thus, the abnormal rate of return for 
the event day is the difference between the observed rate of return on the event day  
                                                 
7 It is important to note that some risk has been already captured by the dummy variables D1 and D2.  
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( etir +, ), minus the forecast rate of return )( , etir +
∧
 estimated prior the event, as 
expressed in equation (3.2). We do this for the event day in addition to the next four 
consecutive days.8 Results are displayed in Table 3.5. None of these days presented 
abnormal returns. All the forecasted returns fall inside the confidence interval of the 
forecast. For example, for the day of the announcement, August 3, 2004, the forecasted 
return is +.0017 and the actual rate of return is -0.007. The abnormal return is -.008, 
which however, falls within the 95 % confidence intervals of the forecast.  
The same applies for the next four days after the announcement. The hypothesis 
of abnormal rates of return is rejected. That is, the market did not punish Sysco for being 
involved in the lawsuit related to the outbreak.9  
3.6.3 Time varying volatility for Sysco  
Time-varying volatility due to the outbreak was examined for Sysco using a 
GARCH approach. In order to begin, the White test was applied to check for 
heteroskedasticity. For this empirical exercise, we considered a total of 141 
observations: 120 prior to the event, the event day, plus 20 more observation after the 
event. The test rejected the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity and the results are 
shown in Table 3.6. Residuals for the simple regression are plotted in Figure 3.3. It is 
immediately apparent that the last 20 observations appear to have increasing variance.  
                                                 
8 Since financial markets adjust immediately to news, we believe that there was no reason to check for 
abnormal returns after the fourth day of the event.  
9 Sysco’s rate of return was not affected by the outbreak’s news on November 3rd, 2003. Sysco was never 
mentioned in the media, so there is no reason for investors to lose interest or modify their position in the 
company.  
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Next, the estimation of the univariate GARCH (1,1) for Sysco was conducted. In 
order to do this, Wang et al (2002) specification was used, which consists of adding 
binary variables to equations (3.4) and (3.5). This is an augmentation of the GARCH 
(p,q) model presented in equations (3.4) and (3.5). More explicitly, the GARCH (1,1) 
model becomes: 
 tmtt DdDdDdDdDdrr εββ +++++++= 554433221110   (3.8) 
 ∑ ∑
= = −−−
+++= 1
1
1
1
66,
2
q p
ptiptqtktt Ddhh ϕεαα   (3.9) 
Equation (3.8) and (3.9) are the mean and variance equations, respectively. The 
binary variables are D1, D2, D3 and D4. D1 takes the values of 1 two days before the 
event day, 0 elsewhere; D2 takes the value of 1 on the event day and 0 elsewhere. D3 
takes the value of 1 two days after the event and 0 elsewhere. D4 and D5 capture earnings 
and acquisition news, respectively. They take the value of 1 the day of the news and 0 
otherwise. D6 captures the unsystematic risk after the event. This variable contains the 
value of zero each day before the event and 1 elsewhere. The GARCH expressed in 
equations (3.8) and (3.9) will capture the volatility effect, if any, due to the outbreak.  
The results produced by the GARCH model in Table 3.3 are quite interesting. In 
the mean equation, 1β , the coefficient for the market portfolio, is statistically significant 
and very close to the one we obtain by using the simple market model. The three dummy 
variables used in this equation have the correct sign, although they are not significant. 
The variance equation is the forecast for variance one period ahead based on past 
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information. This equation produced an important result since the coefficient on D6 is 
statistically significant and positive. This means that after the event, the change in stock 
price volatility was 0.04 percent. That is, after the announcement that Sysco had been 
sued by Prandium, the investors were uncertain of the costs that this event was going to 
generate for Sysco. This behavior augmented the risk of the security.   
3.6.4 Spillovers from Sysco to the industry 
Finally, spillovers from Sysco to the industry were studied. The main purpose of 
this section is to examine if the effect on Sysco was transmitted to other firms that are 
positioned close to Sysco. As discussed at the end of Section 3.4, different publicly 
traded companies along the supply chain are considered. These are Sysco’s competitors 
and clients. The multivariate regression from equation (3.6) becomes: 
 ER +ΖΓ=  (3.10) 
where  
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where iα  is the intercept coefficient for company i. iβ is the systematic risk coefficient 
for company i. iδ and iρ are the coefficients for D1 and D2, respectively and for 
company i. D1 is a column vector 1141×  that contains a binary variable equal to 1 on 
the day of the event and 0 otherwise. D2 is a column vector of the same dimension, 
1141× , with a binary variable that equals 1 each day after the event and 0 otherwise. 
For example, a significant δsuv means that return for Supervalu was different the day of 
the outbreak, suggesting possible spillover. On the other hand, a significant δsuv means 
that Supervalu’s rate of return was impacted cumulatively four days after the event.10 E 
is the residuals vector.  
The results of the multivariate regression (3.10) are shown in Table 3.8. It is 
important to note that all betas were statistically significant, except for βpfgc. Each of the 
betas was less than one, which means that all of these companies were less risky than 
portfolio m, as shown in Figure 3.5.  
In addition, the only company to report a statistical significant dummy variable, 
intended to capture spillovers, was Performance Food Group Company (PFGC). This 
company show a significant coefficient for δpfgc, with a magnitude of 0.075, as shown in 
Table (3.10).  
However, we were unable to determine if this effect was due to a spillover or to 
an internal effect. On the same day Sysco’s lawsuit was announced, Performance Food 
Group registered a high increase in their stock due to an internal change in its 
                                                 
10 The system of equations does not capture earnings and acquisitions  
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management. These two events, occurring on the same day, present a limitation on the 
event study approach. The system cannot distinguish were the effect is coming from, just 
the day on which it occurs.11  
3.7 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper conducts an in depth event study about one of the worst foodborne 
disease outbreaks in the United States: a hepatitis outbreak in Pennsylvania that affected 
more than 600 people in 2003.  
The results of this paper are consistent with the explanatory power of the simple 
market model. A significant limitation in this paper is that Prandium was going through 
a financial crisis when the outbreak occurred. This situation was reflected in the 
volatility of their stock. Thus, it was impossible to draw results and conclusions on the 
market model for this firm. However, Sysco and most of the companies showed a 
significant systematic risk coefficient in this research.  
Some interesting results and conclusions emerged in this work. First, there was 
modest statistical evidence that investors punished the company for being involved in 
the outbreak. Thus, although it experienced increased volatility after the day of the 
event, there were no abnormal returns for Sysco’s stock.  
In addition, there was not significant evidence for spillovers on Sysco’s selected 
clients and competitors. Even the coefficient for Performance Food Group was equal to  
                                                 
11 Isolating this event with a dummy variable is not feasible since it will be identical to D2, which is 
contained in the system.  
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0.075281 and statistical significant, we can not conclude that this is due to a 
spillover from Sysco’s lawsuit. The reason for this is that, on the same day of the event, 
Performance Food Group announced management changes that generate significant 
increase in their rate of return. It is not possible to distinguish the market’s response 
between the internal management change and the bad news for its competitors. 
We believe that the main contribution of this dissertation is to present a SUR  
technique to explore for spillovers in the industry and through the supply chain.  
Finally, this work presents some limitations. The approach used only focuses on the 
financial markets. Some other studies and approaches may improve the conclusions of 
this study.   
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CHAPTER IV 
AN ECONOMIC COST MODULE OF A BIO-SECURITY ANIMAL DISEASE 
RISK SIMULATION 
4.1 BACKGROUND 
Historically, there have been many major animal disease outbreaks around the 
world. Some of these outbreaks have cost millions of dollars to control and eradicate. 
For example, a severe FMD outbreak took place in the United Kingdom in 2001. 
According to et al. (2003), this outbreak forced authorities and ranchers to slaughter and 
dispose of more than six million animals. This situation generated huge economic 
burden on the public and private sector. According to McClaskey et al. (2004), the 
government expenditures were over ₤ 2.8 billion, plus another ₤ 5 billion was lost in the 
private sector.  
In a 1951 FMD outbreak in Canada, two thousand animals were slaughtered at a 
cost of $2 million, but due to movement bans and international trade restrictions, the cost 
increased to $2 billion dollars (Kohnen 2000). Additionally, Kohnen (2000) indicates 
that an FMD outbreak in Italy in 1993 cost $11 million to control and eradicate, but trade 
restrictions increased the cost to $120 million.   
In their essay, Meltzner et al (2003) point out that several major outbreaks of 
pandemic influenza have hit the United States. Outbreaks occurred in 1918, 1957 and 
1968, causing 20 million human deaths in just the first outbreak. Meltzner et al argue 
that the possibility of a pandemic of this disease in the United States is very high, 
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especially if avian influenza is imported. Meltzner et al (2003) and the Center for 
Disease Control and Prevention estimate that the human death rate could be from 89,000 
to 207,000; with hospitalizations rising from 314,000 to 734,000; outpatient visits from 
18 to 42 million; and additional illnesses from 20 to 47 million. The estimated economic 
impact of such an outbreak ranges between $71.3 to $166.5 billion dollars.  
Additionally, the Classical Swine Fever (CSF) hit Europe severely in 1994, 
affecting more than 100 German farms and 48 Belgium farms. Only a few years later, in 
1997-1998, there was a severe outbreak in The Netherlands where almost 500 farms 
were infected, and more than 13,000 pig farms had to slaughter animals (Meuwissen 
1999).  
In addition to the above set of natural, accidental disease animal outbreaks, 
agriculture faces a new threat: terrorism. In his book, Tweeten (2003) points out that 
agriculture is an attractive target for terrorists because relatively simple and inexpensive 
actions can have catastrophic consequences. To reduce potential losses, it is important to 
explore options to prevent outbreaks and be prepared to respond to natural or terrorism-
caused disease outbreaks.  
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) considers agriculture one of the 
economic sectors most vulnerable to natural or intentional disasters. This concern has led 
the DHS to fund and establish a Center for Excellence in Foreign Animal and Zoonotic 
Disease Defense (FAZD) at Texas A&M University. This Center addresses the threats 
presented by deliberately or accidentally introduced foreign animal and/or zoonotic 
diseases (fazd.tamu.edu).  
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This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the objectives and 
justification of this paper. Section 4.3 reviews previous literature on epidemiologic and 
economic assessments and identifies the contribution and gaps in previous research. 
Then, Section 4.4 develops a general conceptual economic model to project the cost 
impacts and aspects of control strategies against an animal disease outbreak. 
Subsequently, Section 4.5 presents the case study and describes the hypothetical disease 
outbreak and the control options investigated in this paper. Then, Section 4.6 discusses 
the estimation procedures and results of the general conceptual model used to calculate 
the economic impact of the hypothetical outbreak. Finally, conclusions are presented.   
4.2 JUSTIFICATION AND OBJECTIVES 
Epidemiological models have been developed to understand how disease 
outbreaks spread under different circumstances. These studies provide helpful insights 
into disease mitigation and lay a foundation for management strategies. Often the 
existing epidemiologic models do not estimate the economic consequences or only 
partially address them for a particular outbreak; see Berensten et al (1992) and Meltzner 
et al (2003). This study develops a generic economic module which estimates cost in the 
face of a simulated animal disease outbreak under different mitigation strategies. This 
model will subsequently be applied in a case study.  The context case study for 
application involves a hypothetical FMD outbreak in the Panhandle of Texas.  
This region was chosen due to its importance in livestock production. According 
to Lawrence and Otto (2005), Texas is the largest cattle producer in the nation with 15 
percent of the US inventory. The Panhandle area has the highest density in cattle 
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production in the state. The area of study considers eight counties: Bailey, Castro, Deaf 
Smith, Hale, Lamb, Parmer, Randall and Swisher. These counties are shown in Figure 
4.1. These counties form a total of 7,942 square miles. There are 92 feedlots, 2,231,300 
cattle on feed, 411,019 grazing cattle, and 17,471 land parcels.  
4.3 LITERATURE REVIEW  
Several studies incorporate epidemiological and economic assessment in their 
models.  For example, Nielen et al (1996) calculated the economic impacts of several 
different strategies for the 1997-1998 swine fever epidemic in The Netherlands. Using 
spatial, temporal, and stochastic simulations, they applied economic and cost factors to 
each of the strategies and found that preventive strategies, such as pre-emptive slaughter, 
are effective policies in mitigating the economic impacts of the disease.   
In the same context, Mewissen et al (1999) developed a model to calculate the 
economic consequences of the swine fever outbreak for farms, government, and other 
participants in the pork supply chain. They found that the total cost for The Netherlands 
outbreak was $2.3 billion dollars.   
Meltzner et al (2003) addressed the question of how many vaccinations are 
needed to reduce the impact of a human influenza outbreak while minimizing costs. 
They used a mathematical model to calculate the returns to vaccination against this 
disease. They found that the largest economic returns come from the prevention of 
deaths, via vaccination, of people who are economically active: younger than 65.  
Schoenbaum and Disney (2003) used a disease simulation model to examine 
hypothetical FMD outbreaks and mitigation strategies in the United States. They found 
  
54
that the choice of strategy depends on the speed of the disease spread and the geographic 
location of the outbreak. They concluded that slaughtering herds in direct contact with 
infected premises is the best economic strategy and the fastest way of eradicating the 
disease. In the same context, Beristein et al (1992) simulated an FMD outbreak in the 
Dutch cattle and pig herds. They found that slaughter is preferred to routine vaccination. 
Furthermore, Disney et al (2001), argue that vaccination is less effective because 
vaccinated animals need to be killed in order to regain access to international markets.  
Disney et al (2001) did a cost benefit analysis and found that animal 
identification is an effective strategy for dealing with disease outbreaks such as FMD. 
Furthermore, they found that the more vertically integrated the sector, the more benefits 
will be obtained by implementing traceability as a pre-event strategy. Elbakidze (2004) 
and Elbakidze and McCarl (2006) analyze ex ante versus ex post strategies in animal 
disease outbreaks, focusing on the decision making process for the case of an FMD 
outbreak deliberately caused by terrorist attack. Similar to Nielen (1996), Elbakidze and 
McCarl (2006) find that for fast spreading diseases, it is more efficient to invest in pre-
event strategies rather than rely on post-event actions. Morris et al (2001) evaluate 
different control policies such as vaccination, slaughter and movement bans for different 
simulations of the 2001 FMD outbreak in Great Britain. They found that the longer it 
takes to execute the policies, the faster the disease spreads out and the higher the 
economic impact.  
Bates et al (2001) did a cost-benefit analysis of preemptive slaughter and 
vaccination as a strategy to mitigate, control, and eradicate an FMD outbreak. They 
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found that vaccination is more cost effective than slaughtering if vaccination does not 
eliminate future trade.  
Jin et al (2005) investigate the optimal level of carcass disposal needed to ensure 
efficiency in disease management by minimizing the cost of carcass disposal under an 
FMD outbreak. They found that vaccination plays a very important role in minimizing 
the total cost of the outbreak since it diminishes the number of slaughter and disposal 
animals in each period of time.  
A general conclusion of the literature is that for fast spreading diseases taking 
preemptive measures, such as slaughter and vaccination, at the beginning of the supply 
chain is more cost effective than waiting. This is, ex ante strategies aid to minimize the 
event cost; such as the loss of animals, the economic impact of the private and public 
sector and the environmental and health externalities. However, there are a number of 
variables that make analysis different across regions and countries. Schoenbaun and 
Disney (2003) point out that the impact of an outbreak depends on trading partners, 
livestock demography, social reactions, disease-control policies, livestock markets and 
the general national economy.  
4.4 A CONCEPTUAL ECONOMIC MODEL 
4.4.1 A general discussion of the model 
Ekboir (1999) argues that a disease outbreak generates a total cost that can be 
divided into three categories: direct costs, extra expenditures in resources, and indirect 
costs. Thus, this can represented as:   
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 ssss TICTERTDCTC ++=  (4.1) 
where sTC is the total cost of outbreak under mitigation strategy s; TDC is the total 
direct cost which includes market value of lost animals, production losses, welfare 
slaughter costs and consumer surplus losses; TER is the summation of all extra 
expenditures to mitigate the disease, such as surveillance implementation, slaughter 
costs, quarantine implementation, and vaccination costs; TIC is the summation of all 
indirect costs, including loss of employment and indirect production losses. Different 
mitigation strategies s are compared during the hypothetical outbreak. The best strategy 
is the one that generates the lowest total cost (TC). This general model is deterministic 
and static.   
4.4.1.1 Interaction of the epidemiologic model and the economic module 
To calculate (4.1), output data from an epidemiologic model needs to be 
incorporated. An epidemiologic model provides information about the behavior of the 
disease and quantifies it in terms of the numbers of animals which become sick. In 
addition, the epidemiologic model uses various herd attributes, such as contact rates, 
location, operation type, as well as characteristics of environment in order to project the 
spread of the disease. The epidemiologic model assigns a particular identification 
number (id), a herd type (ht); such as, feedlot, dairy, swine, etc. and the number of 
animals (NAN) in the herd.12 See Table 4.1. 
                                                 
12 Some calculations may be needed in order to obtain the distribution of animal types due to composition; 
such as, bulls, cows, calves, etc.  
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As a result of disease spread simulation, the epidemiologic model assigns herd 
status and applies different control options to each herd. The status describes the health 
condition of the herd, such as infected, immune, dead and latent; the control variables 
refer to the categorical condition assigned by the authorities, such as vaccination, 
surveillance, quarantine, etc.  
All states are mutually exclusive from one another. This is, each farm can only 
be in one status at a time, but different combinations of control options can be applied to 
each farm. For example, a farm can be either infected or immune, but can be under 
surveillance, vaccination and quarantine at the same time.  
4.4.2 Direct costs definitions 
The first component of equation (4.1) is the direct cost (DCs) which arises from 
animal losses under the outbreak. The total direct cost (TDC) of the outbreak under 
strategy s is equal to: 
              sssss TCSTWSCTFITMVLTDC +++=  (4.2) 
where TMVL is the market value of lost animals, TFI is the foregone income of farms, 
TWSC is the welfare slaughter and movement restriction losses, and TCS represents 
consumer surplus loss, all under strategy s. 
4.4.2.1 Total market value of lost animals (TMVL) 
Under eradication guidelines of zoonotic diseases (USDA 2004), infected and 
latent farms plus other discretional selected herds, depending on the implemented 
strategy (i.e. infected slaughter, ring slaughter, etc.), have to be destroyed. This cost is 
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equal to the market value of loss of animals due to depopulation. Thus, TMVL is equal to 
the total number of slaughtered animals according to their type and market price prior to 
the outbreak.  
In order to calculate the TMVL, we account for the number of animals (NAN) in 
the herd (id) that is of a type (ht). In order to find this value, we need to convert the total 
number of animals slaughtered into the number slaughtered by type of animal. This cost 
can be expressed in the following equation: 
 at
id ht at status
athtsstatusidhtidids VCompLHAHTNANTMVL ∑∑∑ ∑= ,,,,  (4.3) 
where: 
idNAN = the number of animals in the herd (id) 
htidAHT ,  = 0 if herd (id) is not of a type ht 
 1 if herd (id) is of a type ht 
sstatusidLH ,,  = 1 if herd (id) is latent, infected, immune, or dead under 
strategy s 
 0 otherwise 
The third subscript s indicates that LH varies depending on the strategy s used. 
=athtComp ,  Proportion of animal of type (at) in herd type (ht) 
atV   = Value per animal of type (at) 
The first four right hand side variables in equation (4.3) indicate the number and 
type of animals slaughtered in herd (id). Summing these four terms and multiplying by 
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the market price of the animal (at) before the outbreak (V) and sum over (id) will result 
in the Total Market Value Lost (4.3). 
4.4.2.2 Total foregone income (TFI) 
There is a period of time when farms do not produce anything due to livestock 
depopulation. This production inactivity lasts until the reintroduction of new animals. 
According to mitigation and eradication guidelines by the USDA (2004), an infected 
farm cannot return to production until 60 days after cleaning and disinfection.  
This cost is equal to the sum of the farm’s daily incomes for the period during the 
farms’ production inactivity. This cost will vary depending on the season that the farm is 
inactive; livestock farmers have different cash flows during the year due to breeding, 
replacement and selling being seasonal.  
This cost is equal to the forecast average income of the farm during the farm’s 
inactivity and can be expressed as: 
 id
ht status
hshthsidhtidstatusid
hsid
s timeIncomeHSAHTLHTFI *,,,,∑ ∑∑∑=   (4.4) 
where 
sstatusidLH ,, = 1 if status of the herd (id) indicates the status = latent, 
infected, dead or immune according to strategy s 
 0 otherwise 
htidAHT , = 1 if herd (id) is of a type ht 
 0 otherwise   
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hsidHS , = 1 if herd (id) is of herd size (hs) (i.e. small, medium, large) 
 0 otherwise 
hshtIncome ,  = loss per day per herd type (ht) and size (hs) 
sidTime ,  = number of days that the farm (id) was inactive; from the 
day that animals were slaughtered to the day that 
production is reinitiated. In some cases the time of 
inactivity may vary depending on the strategy. 
4.4.2.3 Welfare slaughter costs  
During an outbreak, movement restrictions are implemented in the form of a 
quarantine zone in order to stop the spread of the disease. When an area is under 
quarantine, feed and veterinary supplies may not reach farms. Lacking supplies will have 
an economic impact on the farms. First, if feed does not arrive at a farm on time, animals 
may not experience expected weight gain or may even lose weight. Also, movement 
restrictions over time may affect the health of the animals, and some may have to be 
slaughtered as a consequence. Moreover, farmers will incur costs if there are animals in 
stock that were ready to be taken to the slaughter house, but because of movement 
restrictions, farmers need to keep feeding for longer periods of time. This situation may 
be extended to the point that it is cheaper for the farmer to slaughter the animal than 
continue feeding the animal for a long period of time without being able to sell it due to 
movement restrictions. All of these effects are called welfare slaughter.  
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Welfare slaughter costs can be expressed as  
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 (4.5) 
where 
)( sht timeβ  = proportion of animals in herd type (ht) that are killed;  
this is a function of time that the animals are in quarantine 
idNAN   = the number of animals in herd (id) 
htidAHT ,   = 0 if herd (id) is not of a type ht 
 1 if herd (id) is of a type ht 
sidQ ,   = 0 the herd (id) is not quarantined  
 1 herd (id) is quarantined  
sstatusidLH ,,   = 0 if herd (id) is not of status  
 1 if herd (id) is of status  
athtComp ,  = Proportion of animal of type (at) in herd type (ht) 
atV   = Value per animal of type (at) 
)( sat timeWL  = total weight loss of animals over time 
VWat  = value of the weight for animal type (at) 
atα   = percentage of animals ready to be marketed 
atVF   = value of the feed use for animal type (at) per day 
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Times  = number of days that the herd (id) was cut in transit under 
quarantine restrictions under strategy s 
4.4.2.4 Loss of consumer surplus  
Loss of consumer surplus is the last component of the direct cost equation in 
(4.2) and refers to the economic impact of the outbreak on consumers. One way of 
analyzing this is through welfare analysis. Consumers’ surplus will be affected due to 
changes in supply and demand that will affect market prices and quantities.  
Supply changes are due to the loss of animals along with the movement 
restrictions and quarantine and trade restrictions. On the other hand, demand changes are 
a result of changes in preferences. That is, consumers may change their consumption 
preferences to other types of meat which have not been affected by disease. For 
example, avian influenza outbreaks are currently causing consumers to switch from 
chicken to beef consumption in areas where this disease has appeared.  
The economic impact on consumers can be estimated by measuring the changes 
in consumers’ surplus after the outbreak. An illustration of this is portrayed in Figure 4.2 
and Figure 4.3. There are three scenarios explored here: in the first scenario only 
production is affected by the outbreak; in the second scenario both preferences and 
production change; the third scenario captures the welfare effects due to trade 
restrictions.  
i. Consumers’ surplus due to production losses 
Figure 4.2 assumes that before the outbreak event, the equilibrium is where 
supply (S0) equals demand (D0) with market price (P0) and quantity market (Q0). This 
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generates a consumers’ surplus area of (A,0,P0) and a producers’ surplus area of 
(C,0,P0). Suppose that after the outbreak the supply shifts to (S1) and consumer 
preferences do not change. This generates new consumers’ and producers’ surpluses 
equal to (A,1,P1) and (B,1,P1), respectively. Thus the loss of consumer surplus is the area 
(P1, 1, 0, P0) is transferred directly as producers’ surplus gains. This is evidently due to 
the reduction of quantity and price increase.  
ii. Welfare effects due to production and preference changes 
A different scenario is presented in Figure 4.3 where not only supply changes, 
but demand as well due to change in preferences. In addition, in this case we explore 
more elastic demands. In this scenario, we assume that the market is at equilibrium 
before the disease outbreak, so supply (S0) equals demand (D0), with quantity (Q0) and 
market price (P0). At this stage, the consumers’ surplus (CS0) is reflected by the 
triangular area (A, 0, P0). If we assume that preferences change as well as the supply, the 
new equilibrium after the outbreak is where (S1) equals (D1) with a market price (P1) and 
quantity (Q1). This generates a consumers’ surplus loss of (A,0,P0) minus (B,1,P1).  
iii. Consumer effects due to trade restrictions   
A domestic market labeled as a disease free country will allow producers to have 
access to international markets, which are willing to pay a premium for disease free 
products. This situation may push domestic prices up as illustrated in Figure 4.4.  
Under a closed economy, the market price and quantity will be (P*) and (Q*), 
respectively, as shown in Figure 4.4. Under this scenario, the consumer surplus is 
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(A,0,P*). However, if the country is disease free, the international markets may pay a 
price with a premium, say  (PE), which is higher than the domestic (P*), thus producers 
will produce (QES) and domestic consumers will consume only (QED), generating an 
excess supply that will be exported. However, under an outbreak scenario, the world 
prices will immediately drop, say to (P0). This will cause an excess in demand, since at 
that price consumers are willing to buy (QOD), but suppliers are willing to supply (QOS). 
The excess in supply will be equal to (QOD) minus (QOS). The gain in consumer surplus 
due to the drop in price is represented by the area (1,2,6,4). 
4.4.3 Extra expenditures  
Extra expenditure costs are the second component of the total cost equation in 
(4.1). These costs consider all the extra private and public resources spent to mitigate, 
control, and eradicate the disease. The total extra expenditure cost (TER) of the outbreak 
under strategy s can be calculated using the following equation:  
 sssss TVCTCQITSURCTSLCTER +++=  (4.6) 
where (TSLC) is the total slaughter costs, (TSURC) represents the total surveillance 
costs, (TCQI) calculates the total cost of quarantine implementation, and (TVC) is the 
vaccination costs.    
4.4.3.1 Total slaughter costs (TSLC) 
Total Slaughter Costs (TSLS) capture the expenditures of depopulating the 
infected, latent, dangerous contacts, farms within a ring, and the animals slaughtered 
under quarantine. The cost of depopulating these premises consists of the euthanasia 
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(Eut) and carcass disposal cost (CD) per animal, the cost of appraisal (APC), and the cost 
of cleaning and disinfecting the premise (CCD). The last two costs are based on the herd 
size (hs): small, medium and large.  
The cost of appraisal (APC) per herd is the cost of sending experts to the infected 
and latent premises to estimate market losses for the farmers. The cost of euthanasia is 
the cost of slaughtering animals. The carcass disposal cost refers to the expenses of 
discarding the slaughtered animals. The final cost category is the expense of cleaning 
and disinfecting the premise, so the farm is free from viruses.  
The computation of Total Slaughter Costs (TSLC) is divided into three parts.  
First, we account for the costs of slaughtering the animals that were infected, latent or 
immune. In order to do this, we account for the animals in herd (id) based on herd type 
(ht) and get the number of animals (NAN) according to their type (at) that will be 
slaughtered due to a particular status (status) in (LH). To calculate the euthanasia and 
carcass disposal cost per animal, we multiply the total number of animals in the herd (id) 
times the euthanasia (eut) and carcass disposal (CD) cost per animal. Using a similar 
approach, we account for the cost of slaughtering the animals that were under 
quarantine.  
The third part of the equation calculates the appraisal (APC) and cleaning and 
disinfection (CCD) costs, which are a function of the herd size (hs) and type (ht).  
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4.4.3.2 Total surveillance cost (TSURC) 
Total Surveillance Cost (TSURC): According to USDA (1991) regulations, a 
farm in direct contact or located within a specified geographic area near the outbreak 
will be labeled a farm under surveillance. These farms will receive visits of inspection 
and will be tested.  Usually, this routine will continue for several weeks after the last 
case is found and government takes care of the costs. These visits will include a sample 
test per herd to check for the virus. The surveillance considers two types of costs: the 
cost of the testing (CT) each herd and the cost of visiting (CV) the farms under 
surveillance. In order to compute this cost, we account for the number of visits (NV) 
conducted in a herd (id) under surveillance (HS) times the cost of the visit plus the cost 
of each test (CT), which depend on the herd size (hs). This is expressed in the equation: 
  
 )(*, hs
id hs
hsidhsids CVCTNVHSTSURC += ∑∑  (4.8) 
where 
HSid,hs  = 1 if herd (id) of size (hs) is under surveillance 
 0 otherwise 
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4.4.3.3 Quarantine and security implementation cost (TCQI).  
According to the Quarantine and Movement control (USDA 2004), the purpose 
of quarantine is to prevent pathogens from spreading. When a premise is declared 
infected, all roads and access points that conduct to that premise must be shut down. 
This action is supervised by State and or Federal authorities, depending on the case.   
Implementing movement restrictions and security mechanisms will generate costs for the 
resources used to achieve this control policy. This can be represented in the following 
equation. 
 OMETranswNPTCQI ss +++= *  (4.9) 
where 
sNP  = the number of personnel enforcing the quarantine  
w  = wages 
 
Trans  = Transportation costs 
 
E =    Equipment and supplies 
 
OM =    Other materials such as barriers, warning signs, etc 
 
 where the last three costs of equation (4.9) are fixed and do not depend on the  
strategy s used.  
4.4.3.4  Vaccination cost (TV) 
Vaccination is a strategy to contain the disease quickly; it isolates the infected 
areas from non-infected areas and reduces slaughter volumes. This type of expenditure is 
usually paid by the farmer and/or the government, depending on the situation. 
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Total vaccination cost (TVC) has two main components: a variable and fixed 
cost. The variable cost is the cost per animal vaccination. The fixed cost is the cost of 
sending personal to provide the shots. These two costs can be expressed in the following 
equation: 
              ∑ ∑∑+=
id id
hshsidsid
hs
sidids FCVHSVCVVNATVC ,,,  (4.10) 
where 
 
sidV ,   = 0 if herd id is not vaccinated 
 1 if herd id is vaccinated under strategy s 
CV   = Cost of vaccination per animal  
hsidHS ,   =  1 if herd (id) is of herd size (hs); i.e. small, medium, large 
 0 otherwise  
hsFCV   = Fixed cost of vaccinating per herd size (hs) 
4.4.4 Indirect costs 
Indirect costs are created by the outbreak on businesses linked to the affected 
industry. These include the economic loss of employment (LE) and economic losses of 
firms linked to the affected industry (IPL).13  
 sss IPLLETIC +=  (4.11) 
                                                 
13 The indirect costs can also include some externalities such as damages to the environment and health. 
These types of costs are topics for future research.  
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4.4.4.1 Loss of employment (LE) 
As a result of stopping production, farm workers will be unemployed. We 
account for this as follows: 
 sstatusid
id ht
hsidhtidhshtid
hs
s timewLHHSAHTNELE *,,,,∑∑∑= θ  (4.12) 
where   
θ   = percentage of laid off people in herd (id) out of total 
workers 
hshtNE ,   = the number of employees in herd type (ht) of herd size (hs) 
htidAHT ,   = 1 if herd (id) is of a type ht  
 0 otherwise 
hsidHS ,   =  1 if herd (id) is of the size (i.e. small, medium or large) 
 0 otherwise 
statusidLH ,   = 1 if herd (id) is in status (i.e. infected, dead, immune) 
 0 otherwise 
w  = wage per employer in (id) during the time of inactivity 
stime   = time of inactivity under strategy s 
4.4.4.2 Indirect production loss (IPL) 
Due to eradication guidelines, the affected farms will depopulate and halt 
production for 60 days after cleaning and disinfection. This inactivity will affect 
businesses (b) that are linked to the affected farms, such as feeders and other input 
suppliers. The Indirect Production Loss (ILP) is equal to: 
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 s
B
b
bs timeIncomeTIPL *∑=  (4.13) 
where bIncome  is the daily foregone income of businesses (b) that is linked to the 
affected farms and time is the number of days of inactivity.  
4.5 THE CASE STUDY 
The case study presented in this paper uses the general conceptual economic 
model developed in Section 4.4 to predict the cost of a hypothetical Foot and Mouth 
disease outbreak in the Panhandle region of Texas. Seven different types of farms in this 
region are analyzed: (1) large beef cattle operations (more than 10 heads in inventory), 
(2) dairy, (3) sheep, (4) swine, (5) sheep and swine, (6) small beef operations (i.e. cattle 
in backyards, less than 10 heads) and (7) feedlots. 
The economic cost module captures two main facets during this outbreak: first, 
the cost of the disease behavior, and, second, the cost of mitigating the disease. 
In the hypothetical outbreak, the cost of the disease behavior begins when one 
herd is randomly infected; then, it continues spreading among other herds. The cost of 
mitigation begins when authorities start applying different control options to mitigate the 
disease.  
Several control options are considered in this case study. All of them correspond 
with the USDA guidelines.  
The first control option to be applied when a herd is suspected or confirmed to 
have the disease is to quarantine it, according to the USDA (2003) guidelines.  
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Quarantine refers to applying movement restrictions to those premises infected or 
suspected to be infected with the disease. Quarantine mitigates and seeks to prevent the 
spread of disease.  
After a herd is under quarantine, some other control variables may apply 
depending on the herd status. For example, a quarantined herd could be vaccinated or 
slaughtered or turn into a herd under surveillance.  
Vaccination is a control option that will delay the spread of the disease to other 
animals. It will also buy time to slaughter and dispose of animals at different points in 
time, rather than doing it all at once. This epidemiological case considers two different 
vaccination strategies: ring vaccination and targeted vaccination. The first strategy 
vaccinates within a geographical area and the second targets specific herds.  
Another control option used is surveillance, which refers to sending professional 
people to visit farms within 15 kilometers of the outbreak, in accordance with USDA 
guidelines (1991). The surveillance costs include testing and professional visits. These 
visits continue for 30 days after the last case of infection (see Table 4.2).  
The fourth control option is to slaughter the animals that are in a particular status; 
such as latent, immune, or infected. Slaughtering can also be applied to herds that due to 
their proximity have the potential to be infected.  
This case study uses different control options to form strategies to mitigate the 
disease. There are five different control strategies, and they are shown in Table 4.3.  
As can be observed in Table 4.3, each strategy is a combination of different 
control options to herds under a particular status. For example, Strategy 2 indicates to 
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quarantine, surveillance, and slaughter all herds under the status “latent, immune, or 
infected” plus implementing the control option to slaughter dangerous contact herds.  
The infected herds are defined as herds that have animals shedding the virus and 
may transfer it to other animals or herds. Dangerous contacts are herds that have not 
been confirmed to have the virus but have the potential to get it due to their proximity or 
potential contact with infected herds. Finally, contiguous herds are herds that are located 
close to the infected herds.    
These five strategies generate different hypothetical epidemiological outputs, and 
the summary statistics are presented in Table 4.4.  
The simulation model used here incorporates some movement restrictions after 
the detection of the outbreak; herds affected by movement restrictions are labeled as 
herds in quarantine and are shown in Table 4.4. These restrictions follow the USDA and 
Texas Animal Health Commission guidelines, which request for an immediate end to 
movement after the first case of FMD is diagnosed.  
Additionally, the surveillance implementation follows the guidelines of the 
USDA Quarantine and Movement Control (2003) which states that a radius of 3 
kilometers must be flagged for surveillance from the location of the herd detected with 
FMD. The surveillance requires different numbers of visits, which are reported in the 
output results of the epidemiological model. Infected areas will be vaccinated at the 
discretion of Federal authorities. Vaccination is a strategy to create barriers between 
infected areas and disease free regions. Finally, all infected and latent herds will be 
slaughtered.   
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According to the team leaders of this model, one of the main highlights that this 
method offers is that it captures the spread of disease due to cattle movement across the 
region as well as through direct and indirect contacts. This is a stochastic susceptible-
infected-recovered (SIR) model, which allows using different types of GIS (Geographic 
Information System) data; such as polygons or simple points. This epidemic model is 
orthogonal and the simulation can be initiated at any location(s), allowing to capture the 
epidemic progression and to trace back the dynamics of the spread.   
4.6 DATA 
Data comes from different data bases, literature and in some cases from personal 
interviews with experts. In addition, some data needed to be calculated in order to 
complete the economic model. Two types of data are entered as inputs in the economic 
model: epidemiologic and economic data.  
4.6.1 Epidemiologic data 
The epidemiologic data comes from a model developed by Garner (1994), which 
is being adjusted and modified by The National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic 
Disease Defense (FAZD) at Texas A&M University. 14  Some of the epidemiologic 
inputs used in this project can be found in Ward (2006). As described in Section 4.4.2, 
some calculations and adjustments needed to be done in order to convert the 
epidemiologic output to an input for the economic model. These calculations are 
 
                                                 
14 Linda Highfield and Dr. Ward are leading this project.  
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explained in the next section along with the variables and parameters used in the  
calculation of the economic model.  
4.6.2 The economic data 
4.6.2.1 Market value per animal (Vat) 
In order to obtain the market value per animal (Vat) some calculations need to be 
done. The epidemiologic model does not report the number of each type of animal in 
each herd, but only the total number of animals (NAN) in each herd. To correct for this, 
the number of animals (NAN) in herd (id) of type (ht) was decomposed into types of 
animals using a matrix called animal composition (Comp). This matrix is shown in 
Table 4.5 and contains the percentages of animal types in each type of herd. Each 
column in the matrix indicates the percent of animal types corresponding to the herd 
type. If the value is 0.00% that means the animal type does not exist in that herd type. 
There are a total of nineteen different animal types in the study for all the herd types. 
Some herds have more animal types than others, for example, grazing farms have six 
types of animals and the mix farms have eight. Obtaining the data on composition had 
several limitations, especially because in reality the animal composition varies from 
farm to farm. For example, the composition of grazing farms varies significantly from 
one to another.15 
                                                 
15 We are grateful to Doug Tolleson at the FAZD Center for providing this valuable information. This data 
is a discretionary estimate. 
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In order to obtain the number of animals by type, a multiplication of the scalar 
(NAN) times the corresponding column (by herd type) of the matrix (Comp) is carried 
out.  
Market prices for each animal type come from the National Agricultural 
Statistics Services (NASS) Agricultural Statistics Board, produced by the USDA. This 
document was released on January 31, 2006. These prices are expressed in hundred 
pounds (cwt) and are shown in Table 4.5.  
Because animal prices are expressed in (cwt), in order to obtain the value per 
animal (Vat), we assign an average weight to each animal and multiply it by its price in 
(cwt). These weights are shown in Table 4.6 and are obtained from the Agricultural 
Marketing Service, USDA. Then, with all the weights and the values expressed in the 
same units, the price for each animal type (Vat) is calculated as shown in the third 
column of Table 4.6.  
4.6.2.2 Welfare and slaughter costs 
In order to determine the number of animals that die due to quarantine and 
movement restrictions, we impose a β equal to 5 percent. This indicates that five 
percent of the animals that were under the status of quarantine died.16 The reason for this 
is that evidence shows that during the FMD outbreak in the UK, 30 percent of all 
                                                 
16 This assumption may be strong, since the number of animals in welfare slaughter may vary depending 
on their herd and animal type and even from other circumstances; such as the weather. This is, if the 
weather allows for good grass, some types of animals, such as cattle may resist dying from movement 
controls.  
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animals slaughtered were due to welfare. That is, if we let β =.05, this will give us an 
average of 30 percent of all animals slaughtered due to wealfare.  
The last two parts of the welfare equation (4.5) were not calculated due to lack of 
data. We do not have any data or evidence of the loss of weight of animals and the value 
of animals not marketed due to quarantine.   
4.6.2.3 Slaughter, surveillance and vaccination costs 
Schoenbaum and Disney (2003) estimated costs are used in order to compute the 
slaughter, surveillance, and vaccination costs. The cost of slaughter and surveillance 
varies depending on the herd size (hs). There are just three sizes in this study: small (0 to 
99 animals), medium (100 to 500 animals) and large (more than 500 animals). It is 
assumed that size determination is the same across herd types. That is, a hog farm with 
99 animals and a dairy with the same number of animals are both considered small 
farms. Another assumption is that the cost of slaughter and surveillance is the same 
regardless of herd type. These costs are shown in Table 4.2 and 4.7. 
The cost of vaccination has two components: a variable and a fixed cost. For 
each herd that is vaccinated, a fixed cost is incurred regardless of the number of animals 
vaccinated.  In addition, a variable cost comprised of the expense of vaccinating each 
animal is added.  
4.6.2.4 Employment 
The employment data is calculated using information from the National 
Cattlemen’s Beef Association. There are approximately forty-thousand jobs related to 
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agriculture in the Panhandle area. In order to estimate the number of layoffs due to an 
outbreak, we assume 25 percent of the total employment in the area will be subjected to 
layoffs. This is, we impose the parameter 25.0=θ . This is a strong assumption, since 
there is no previous information on how many people would lose their jobs or for how 
long under an FMD outbreak in the Panhandle region of Texas.   
4.6.2.5 Cost of quarantine implementation 
In order to calculate the quarantine implementation, as described by equation 
(4.9) we use previous documentation by McCauley et al (1979). In their work, they 
estimate the cost for a hypothetical case related to an FMD outbreak in Minnesota. We 
use this last case to calculate the cost of quarantine in Texas. They assume that 28 roads 
are closed for the duration of the quarantine. They use 52 one-man stations and 6 two-
man base stations to quarantine the area. This is, to quarantine an area due to an FMD 
outbreak, they use 64 people. Since their costs are expressed in 1979 prices, we adjust 
them for inflation. Assuming the yearly costs of quarantine for the state of Texas are the 
same as Minnesota’s, we have: 
 Salary of personnel $6,534,869 
 Transportation $94,092 
 Warning signs $65,527 
Equipment $328,479 
Barriers  $93447 
Total Quarantine Cost: $7,119,416 per year 
 
Thus, if the outbreak lasts 90 days, and, assuming the quarantine has the same 
duration, the cost for implementing a quarantine is $1,779,854.  
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4.6.2.6 Income per farm 
In order to calculate the Income Production Loss in equation (4.13) we use data 
obtained from the Agricultural Income and Finance Outlook (USDA 2005). This data is 
expressed as a national average per farm type, regardless of farm size. Although this 
assumption might seem strong, income per farm varies significantly, and there might be 
cases where a medium beef farm is making more income than large farms of the same 
type.  
4.7 APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC MODEL AND RESULTS 
4.7.1 The case of a hypothetical outbreak of FMD in the Texas Panhandle  
In order to calculate the economic cost for a hypothetical outbreak of an FMD 
outbreak in the Texas Panhandle, the methodology described in section 4.3 is used. All 
computations were performed in GAMS.  
The total cost of the outbreak begins by calculating each component of equation 
(4.1) for each of the five independent strategies. The summary of results is shown in 
Table 4.8. 
As shown in Table 4.8, the lowest total cost of the outbreak is generated under 
strategy one, and the highest cost is generated when strategy four is applied. 
The reason that strategy one generates the lowest cost is because this contains 
few control options: only surveillance, quarantine, and slaughter if infected. This 
strategy is not as aggressive as the rest of the strategies, which additionally implement 
vaccination and/or the slaughter of dangerous contacts and/or contiguous herds.  
  
79
In contrast, strategy four contains more control options, including ring 
vaccination, in addition to the control options used in strategy one. Moreover, the results 
of equation (4.1) show that total direct cost is the most significant component of total 
costs. It represents more than 95 percent of the total costs.  
However, the magnitudes of the components of total direct cost vary depending 
on the strategy used. For example, under strategy one, total welfare slaughter is almost 
four times larger than the market value of the animals lost. On the other hand, under 
strategy four this relationship is reversed, with the market value of lost animals seven 
times larger than welfare slaughter costs. The reason for this is that when vaccination is 
applied, the quarantine buffer is much wider, increasing the costs for welfare slaughter. 
The components of the direct cost vary depending on the control options used. 
For example, even though strategy one presents the lowest total direct cost and total cost, 
it contains the highest welfare slaughter cost. On the other hand, strategy four presents 
the highest total direct cost but the smallest welfare cost. The reason for this is that 
strategy four compensates with the control option of vaccination, so the quarantine 
buffer is small.   
In the same context, strategies four and five present the highest foregone income 
but the smallest welfare slaughter. These results show that there is a tradeoff between 
vaccination, slaughter, and quarantine. When vaccination is applied, the quarantine 
buffer is small, but the number of slaughtered herds will increase.  
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For the total extra expenditure resources, strategies four and five present the 
highest expenditures. This occurs because when herds are vaccinated, more herds will go 
to slaughter, which generates a cost.  
For the calculation of indirect cost, we face several limitations. Even if data was 
available, this changes depending on many variables. Some of the indirect cost effects 
even depend on psychological variables.  
4.8 CONCLUSIONS  
Estimating the economic impact of a disease outbreak assists in laying the 
foundation for better policy design and implementation in case of an unexpected disease 
outbreak. The current literature review shows that most of the existing studies focus on 
the epidemiologic side. They are usually an extension of the epidemiologic models. 
Section 4.4 in this chapter tries to fill out that gap by presenting a general economic 
conceptual model to be used under different situations and using an epidemiologic 
model as a source of inputs.   
Within an economist mindset, the goal should not be only to calculate purely the 
economic impact of the disease, but to also explore different alternatives and strategies 
to minimize costs.  
The main limitation we face in applying the general economic model to the case 
study is data availability in different areas. For example, there is no detailed data on 
welfare slaughter; thus we must impose assumptions, whose results can vary 
significantly when relaxed. 
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However, the results presented in this paper suggest that the best policy is to 
slaughter only the infected, latent and immune herds. Among the five strategies used in 
this research, the least preferred is the one that slaughters the infected, latent and 
immune herd slaughter in addition to ring vaccination. It is important to mention that this 
research carries some limitations. For example, different sizes of outbreaks need to be 
studied in order to derive more robust conclusions about economic efficiency of each 
strategy. For the particular case of this research, a small outbreak indicates that 
vaccination is not economically efficient but that might not be the case if the outbreak is 
larger. Moreover, this research would also be more robust if uncertainty were factored 
in.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation studies different aspects of the supply chain in diverse markets 
under different conditions. The first paper (Chapter II) analyzes the behavior of farm to 
retail price transmission for the milk industry in selected cities of the United States. The 
Houck approach and the von Cramon-Taubadel and Loy Error Correction Model 
approach were used. The results for the farm to retail price transmission parallels what 
the literature has documented for other markets: there is asymmetric transmission for 
each of the seven cities analyzed. In addition, presenting the segmented elasticities of 
price transmission is important. Few previous related works have provided the estimates 
of these elasticities. The segmentation provides vital information about the relation 
between retail and farm prices and the structure of the market. They measure the 
percentage change in retail price of a commodity due to a one percent change in farm 
price. 
Another important result is that the Houck and the Error Correction Model were 
compared statistically, and there is little evidence that the latter is superior. The main 
difference between these approaches is the speed of adjustment. Under the ECM, 
changes in retail prices adjust faster to positive changes in farm price than to negative 
changes in farm prices. Under the ECM, the retail prices adjust very slowly to negative 
changes in farm price. However, the Houck results do not show a distinction in the speed 
of adjustment. The computed elasticities of price transmission for rising farm prices are 
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generally larger than the corresponding elasticities associated with falling farm prices 
calculated under both approaches, Houck and ECM. Finally, the short-run elasticities 
were smaller in magnitude than the ones previously reported in the literature.  
The second paper (Chapter III) conducts an event study related to one of the 
worst foodborne disease outbreaks in the United States food industry. The incident refers 
to a hepatitis outbreak that sickened more than 600 people.  There were two main 
companies involved: Prandium and Sysco.  
Event study methodology was the main tool to evaluate how the outbreak 
affected the value of the firms. Moreover, this model was extended to study how the 
event affected the rate of returns and risk of other companies positioned in the same 
supply chain and industry.  
Applying the market model to investigate Prandium had some limitations, mainly 
because this company filed for bankruptcy a few weeks before the outbreak.   
However, the augmented market model for Sysco generated interesting results. 
The systematic risk coefficient was less than one and significant. However, there was no 
evidence of abnormal returns, although the GARCH (1,1) model suggested evidence that 
the returns on stock were more volatile after the event.  
Finally, we augmented the market model to explore for spillovers in the industry 
and through the supply chain due to the hepatitis outbreak. We were unable to find any 
evidence for spillovers. The only company to have a statistical significant coefficient in 
the system was Performance Food Group Company. However, we were unable to 
determine if this effect was due to a spillover or an internal event of this company, since 
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both events coincided on the same day.  The rest of the companies did not present any 
spillover effects.  
However, even if there was no clear evidence for spillovers in this particular 
case, the SUR technique is a versatile tool to test for spillovers in the industry and 
thought the supply chain.    
The third paper (Chapter III) developed a general economic model that accounts 
for the potential economic impact of a disease outbreak. Then, the model was presented 
for the hypothetical case of an FMD outbreak in the Panhandle of Texas. Five different 
strategies were evaluated.  
The results show that for this type of outbreak, lasting only 90 days, the best 
strategy is only to slaughter the infected herds. It seems that any other type of strategy 
would not be as efficient as the first one. However, these results could change if, for 
example, the length of the outbreak is larger in size and longer in time.  
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APPENDIX A 
Table 2.1.  Granger Causality Tests from 1994:01 to 2002:10 Based on Monthly Data of Farm and 
Retail Prices for Whole Milka 
City Effect 
Hypothesized 
Cause F-statistic P-value 
Atlanta 
Atlanta 
Farm Price 
Retail Price 
Retail Price 
Farm Price 
0.65 
3.31 
0.5217 
0.0406* 
Boston 
Boston 
Farm Price 
Retail Price 
Retail Price 
Farm Price 
1.69 
0.04 
0.1881 
0.9612 
Chicago 
Chicago 
Farm Price 
Retail Price 
Retail Price 
Farm Price 
0.55 
4.55 
0.5814 
0.0219* 
Dallas 
Dallas 
Farm Price 
Retail Price 
Retail Price 
Farm Price 
0.92 
9.00 
0.4010 
0.0003* 
Hartford 
Hartford 
Farm Price 
Retail Price 
Retail Price 
Farm Price 
0.04 
0.75 
0.9652 
0.4755 
Seattle 
Seattle 
Farm Price 
Retail Price 
Retail Price 
Farm Price 
0.13 
6.28 
0.8799 
0.0027* 
St. Louis 
St. Louis 
Farm Price 
Retail Price 
Retail Price 
Farm Price 
0.35 
22.69 
0.3474 
0.0000* 
* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
a  The null hypothesis is that one series does not Granger cause another.  The Granger causality 
tests use a lag length of two months. 
 
Table 2.2.  Granger Causality Tests from 1994:01 to 2002:10 Based on Monthly Data of Farm and 
Retail Prices for Two Percent Milka 
City Effect 
Hypothesized 
Cause F-statistic P-value 
Atlanta 
Atlanta 
Farm Price 
Retail Price 
Retail Price 
Farm Price 
0.19 
3.36 
0.8308 
0.0387* 
Boston 
Boston 
Farm Price 
Retail Price 
Retail Price 
Farm Price 
1.25 
0.42 
0.2898 
0.6607 
Chicago 
Chicago 
Farm Price 
Retail Price 
Retail Price 
Farm Price 
1.03 
10.79 
0.3580 
0.0001* 
Dallas 
Dallas 
Farm Price 
Retail Price 
Retail Price 
Farm Price 
0.43 
5.92 
0.6536 
0.0037* 
Hartford 
Hartford 
Farm Price 
Retail Price 
Retail Price 
Farm Price 
0.18 
0.72 
0.8348 
0.4899 
Seattle 
Seattle 
Farm Price 
Retail Price 
Retail Price 
Farm Price 
0.55 
6.09 
0.5792 
0.0032* 
St. Louis 
St. Louis 
Farm Price 
Retail Price 
Retail Price 
Farm Price 
2.02 
32.65 
0.1378 
0.0000* 
 
* indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
a  The null hypothesis is that one series does not Granger cause another.  The Granger   causality 
tests use a lag length of two months. 
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Table 2.3.  Descriptive Statistics of Whole Milk Prices at the Farm and Retail Level of the 
Marketing Channel 
City Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Farm Prices – Whole Milk 
      
Atlanta 1.41 1.38 0.14 1.13 1.83 
Boston 1.46 1.47 0.12 1.25 1.78 
Chicago 1.36 1.32 0.14 1.15 1.75 
Dallas 1.37 1.34 0.12 1.16 1.76 
Hartford 1.45 1.47 0.12 1.24 1.77 
Seattle 1.28 1.26 0.13 1.05 1.66 
St. Louis 1.37 1.35 0.14 1.13 1.75 
Retail Prices – Whole Milk 
Atlanta 2.67 2.69 0.42 1.98 3.29 
Boston 2.66 2.61 0.23 2.33 3.08 
Chicago 2.99 2.95 0.26 2.66 3.49 
Dallas 2.63 2.62 0.28 2.22 3.22 
Hartford 2.68 2.68 0.23 2.38 3.10 
Seattle 3.29 3.18 0.30 2.92 3.92 
St. Louis 2.80 2.92 0.30 2.24 3.26 
 
Table 2.4.  Descriptive Statistics of Two Percent Milk Prices at the Farm and Retail Level of the 
Marketing Channel 
City Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Farm Prices – Two Percent Milk 
Atlanta 1.29 1.25 0.12 1.03 1.68 
Boston 1.33 1.33 0.10 1.14 1.63 
Chicago 1.23 1.20 0.13 0.91 1.60 
Dallas 1.24 1.21 0.11 0.96 1.61 
Hartford 1.32 1.32 0.10 1.13 1.63 
Seattle 1.15 1.14 0.12 0.94 1.51 
St. Louis 1.24 1.22 0.13 0.96 1.60 
Retail Prices – Two Percent Milk 
Atlanta 2.67 2.69 0.42 1.98 3.22 
Boston 2.54 2.47 0.29 2.14 3.05 
Chicago 2.78 2.72 0.37 2.26 3.39 
Dallas 2.63 2.62 0.28 2.12 3.22 
Hartford 2.61 2.56 0.27 2.25 3.07 
Seattle 3.17 3.09 0.30 2.72 3.82 
St. Louis 2.74 2.85 0.31 2.16 3.23 
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Table 2.5.  Empirical Results of the Johansen Cointegration Tests for Farm Prices and Retail Prices 
of Whole Milk 
City 
Hypothesized Number 
of Cointegrated  
Equation 
Trace 
Statistic P-Value 
Maximal Eigenvalue 
Statistic P-Value 
Atlanta None 
At most 1 
20.79 
2.41 
  0.0072* 
0.1202 
18.38 
2.41 
  0.0106* 
0.1202 
Boston None 
At most 1 
8.23 
0.03 
0.4407 
0.8674 
8.20 
0.03 
0.3581 
0.8674 
Chicago None 
At most 1 
19.93 
2.07 
  0.0100* 
0.1498 
17.85 
2.07 
  0.0129* 
0.1498 
Dallas None 
At most 1 
23.95 
1.49 
  0.0021* 
0.2215 
22.46 
1.49 
  0.0021* 
0.2215 
Hartford None 
At most 1 
6.95 
0.11 
0.5826 
0.7378 
6.84 
0.11 
0.5076 
0.7378 
Seattle None 
At most 1 
12.00 
0.75 
0.1568 
0.3867 
11.25 
0.75 
0.1420 
0.3867 
St. Louis None 
At most 1 
11.86 
2.71 
0.1636 
0.0992 
14.26 
2.71 
0.0742 
0.0992 
* EVIEWS 5.0 was the statistical package employed to conduct these cointegration rank tests.  
The intercept (no trend) option with four lags was used in conjunction with these tests.  The level 
of significance chosen for this analysis was 0.05. 
 
 
Table 2.6.  Empirical Results of the Johansen Cointegration Rank Tests for Farm Prices and Retail 
Prices of Two Percent Milk 
City 
Hypothesized 
Number of 
Cointegrated 
Equation 
Trace 
Statistic P-Value 
Maximal 
Eigenvalue 
Statistic P-Value 
Atlanta None 
At most 1 
31.43 
2.44 
  0.0001* 
0.1178 
28.99 
2.44 
  0.0001* 
0.1178 
Boston None 
At most 1 
14.37 
0.52 
0.0733 
0.4715 
13.85 
0.52 
0.0580 
0.4715 
Chicago None 
At most t 1 
26.92 
1.98 
  0.0006* 
0.1587 
24.94 
1.98 
  0.0007* 
0.1587 
Dallas None 
At most 1 
23.28 
1.39 
  0.0027* 
0.2378 
21.89 
1.39 
  0.0026* 
0.2378 
Hartford None 
At most 1 
11.80 
0.26 
0.1668 
0.6071 
11.53 
0.26 
0.1294 
0.6071 
Seattle None 
At most 1 
18.10 
0.85 
  0.0198* 
0.3568 
17.25 
0.85 
  0.0163* 
0.3568 
St. Louis None 
At most 1 
22.00 
3.57 
  0.0045* 
0.0589 
18.43 
3.57 
  0.0103* 
0.0589 
* EVIEWS 5.0 was the statistical package employed to conduct these cointegration rank tests.  
The intercept (no trend) option with four lags was used in conjunction with these tests.  The level 
of significance chosen for this analysis was 0.05. 
  
96
Table 2.7.  Variable Definitions for Tables 2.8-2.11 
Term Implication 
Pft
+∆ (SR+)  Positive Change in Farm Price in the Short- run (Contemporaneous Change) 
 
+
−∆ iftP   Positive Change in Farm Price Lagged i Periods 
 
LR+ Positive Cumulative Change in the Long Run  
Pft
−∆ (SR-) Negative Change in Farm Price in the Short- run (Contemporaneous Change)  
+
−∆ iftP  Negative Change in Farm Price Lagged i Period  
LR- Negative Cumulative Change in the Long Run  
 
Table 2.8.  Empirical Results of the Houck Procedure for Whole Milk 
Variable Atlanta Boston Chicago Dallas Hartford Seattle St. Louis   
Intercept -0.003674a 
(0.5553)b 
-0.006278 
(0.1315) 
-0.006940 
(0.5363 
0.013621 
(0.1418) 
-0.003446 
(0.4544) 
-0.004268 
(0.6176) 
0.008727 
(0.2678) 
Pft
+∆ (SR+) 0.27510 (0.0014) 0.45386 (0.0000) 0.44294 (0.0001) 0.23056 (0.0338) 0.41118 (0.0000) 0.22775 (0.0027) 0.27159 (0.0015) 
1Pft
+
−∆  0.27510 (0.0014) 0.45386 (0.0000) 0.44294 (0.0001) 0.23056 (0.0338) 0.41118 (0.0000) 0.30366 (0.0027) 0.27159 (0.0015) 
2Pft
+
−∆  -- -- 0.16940 (0.0012) 0.21221 (0.0000) -- 0.22775 (0.0027) -- 
LR+ 0.55019 
(0.0014) 
0.90773 
(0.0000) 
0.88589 
(0.0001) 
0.46112 
(0.0338) 
0.82235 
(0.0000) 
0.75915 
(0.0027) 
0.54317 
(0.0015) 
Pft
−∆ (SR-) 0.04957 (0.2215) 0.11877 (0.0203) 0.16940 (0.0012) 0.21221 (0.0000) 0.13221 (0.0069) 0.14008 (0.0237) 0.28594 (0.0000) 
1Pft
−
−∆  0.04957 (0.2215) 0.11877 (0.0203) 0.22587 (0.0012) 0.28294 (0.0000) 0.13221 (0.0069) 0.14008 (0.0237) 0.28594 (0.0000) 
2Pft
−
−∆  -- -- 0.16940 (0.0012) 0.21221 (0.0000) -- -- -- 
   LR- 0.09914 
(0.2215) 
0.23754 
(0.0203) 
0.56467 
(0.0012) 
0.70738 
(0.0000) 
0.26442 
(0.0069) 
0.28015 
(0.0237) 
0.57188 
(0.0000) 
AR(1) -- -0.222235 
(0.0228) 
-- -.151807 
(0.1359) 
-- -0.369191 
(0.0002) 
-- 
AR(2) -- -0.358957 
(0.0228) 
-- -- -- -- -- 
R2 0.2115 0.3537 0.2496 0.2157 0.3402 0.2113 0.3325 
DW 2.05 2.10 2.10 2.05 2.17 2.01 2.24 
SIC -3.2477 -3.2955 -2.1980 2.3026 -3.8033 -2.4033 -2.8426 
AIC -3.3240 -3.4241 -2.2747 2.4055 -3.8796 -2.5062 -2.9189 
a Parameter estimate 
b p-value 
c Variable definitions are found in Table 2.7 
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Table 2.9.  Empirical Results of the Houck Procedure for Two Percent Milk 
Variable Atlanta Boston Chicago Dallas Hartford Seattle St. Louis   
Intercept -0.002636a 
(0.6576)b 
-0.007404 
(0.1422) 
-0.006115 
(0.5837) 
0.017055 
(0.1170) 
-0.004233 
(0.3340) 
-0.000960 
(0.9134) 
0.01078 
(0.0990) 
Pft
+∆ (SR+) 0.28877 (0.0000) 0.43083 (0.0000) 0.46785 (0.0000) 0.07757 (0.1610 0.38266 (0.0000) 0.19077 (0.0053) 0.21396 (0.0000) 
1Pft
+
−∆  0.28877 (0.0000) 0.43083 (0.0000) 0.46785 (0.0000) 0.11635 (0.1610) 0.38266 (0.0000) 0.25437 (0.0053) 0.28528 (0.0000) 
2Pft
+
−∆  -- -- -- 0.11635 (0.1610) -- 0.19077 (0.0053) 0.21396 (0.0000) 
3Pft
+
−∆  -- -- -- 0.07757 (0.1610) -- -- -- 
LR+ 0.57753 
(0.0000) 
0.86165 
(0.0000) 
0.93570 
(0.0000) 
0.38785 
(0.1610) 
0.76532 
(0.0000) 
0.63592 
(0.0053) 
0.71321 
(0.0000) 
Pft
−∆ (SR-) 0.03257 (0.4227) 0.11671 (0.0574) 0.26141 (0.0009) 0.22394 (0.0001) 0.13135 (0.0191) 0.16906 (0.0237) 0.38307 (0.0000) 
1Pft
−
−∆  0.03257 (0.4227) 0.1167) (0.0574) 0.26141 (0.0009) 0.29858 (0.0001) 0.13135 (0.0191) 016906 (0.0237) 0.38307 (0.0000) 
2Pft
−
−∆  -- -- --     0.22394    (0.0001) -- -- -- 
LR- 0.06514 
(0.4227) 
0.23342 
(0.0574) 
0.52281 
(0.0009) 
0.74647 
(0.0001) 
0.26270 
(0.0191) 
0.33811 
(0.0237) 
0.76614 
(0.0000) 
AR(1) -- -0.216414 
(0.0223) 
-- -- -- -0.416440 
(0.0000) 
-0276731 
(0.0054) 
AR(2) -- -0.421606 
(0.0000) 
-- -- -0.349744 
(0.0003) 
-- -- 
R2 0.1826 0.3643 0.2784 0.1682 0.3877 0.2368 0.4342 
DW 2.01 2.21 2.17 2.25 2.29 2.03 2.07 
SIC -3.3355 -3.0374 -2.1111 -2.2891 -3.5327 -2.1024 -2.7567 
AIC -3.4113 -3.1653 -2.1870 -2.3659 -3.6613 -2.2047 -2.8590 
a Parameter estimate 
b p-value 
c Variable definitions are found in Table 2.7 
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Table 2.10.  Error Correction Model Results for Whole Milk 
Vqriqble Atlanta Chicago Dallas 
Intercept -0.002137a 
(0.7603)b 
-0.005022 
(0.6858) 
0.020109 
(0.0908) 
Pft
+∆ (SR+) 0.31739 (0.0000) 0.48246 (0.0001) 0.32577 (0.0097) 
1Pft
+
−∆  0.31739 (0.0000) 0.48246 (0.0001) 0.32477 (0.0097) 
LR+ 0.63478 
(0.0000) 
0.96492 
(0.0001) 
0.65153 
(0.0097) 
Pft
−∆ (SR-) 0.03149 (0.1449) 0.1713 (0.0023) 0.2479 (0.0000) 
1Pft
−
−∆  0.04723 (0.1449) 0.2284 (0.0023) 0.33054 (0.0000) 
2Pft
−
−∆  0.04723 (0.1449) 0.1713 (0.0023) 0.2479 (0.0000) 
3Pft
−
−∆  0.03149 (0.1449) -- -- 
LR- 0.15744 
(0.1449) 
0.57171 
(0.0023) 
0.82635 
(0.0000) 
1ECTt
+
−  
-0.127414 
(0.3294) 
0.012534 
(0.9226) 
1.31208 
(0.0945) 
1ECTt
−
−  
-0.125466 
(0.3595) 
0.123136 
(0.3607) 
1.488138 
(0.0514) 
1Prt−∆  -- -0.137828 (0.2844) -1.567282 (0.0505) 
2Prt−∆  -0.216006 (0.0733) -- 1.22297 (0.0965) 
3Prt−∆  -0.165305 (0.0876) -- -- 
4Prt−∆  -- -- -- 
R2 0.2588 0.2626 0.2573 
DW 1.87 1.980 2.06 
F-statistic 
For Model 
Superiority 
Lag structure  different 0.5695 
(0.6364) 
1.9373 
(0.1104) 
AIC -3.2877 -2.2339 -2.4122 
SIC -3.1075 -2.0805 -2.2332 
   a Parameter estimate 
   b p-value 
   c Variable definitions are found in Table 2.7 
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Table 2.11.  Error Correction Model Results for Two Percent Milk 
 Variable Atlanta Chicago Dallas Seattle St. Louis 
Intercept -0.001856a 
(0.8184)b 
-0.005114 
(0.7017) 
0.024648 
(0.0577) 
-0.013962 
(0.3009) 
0.020099 
(0.0333) 
Pft
+∆ (SR+) 0.31075 (0.0000) 0.4937 (0.0000) 0.09969 (0.0772) 0.26451 (0.0052) 0.2739 (0.0000) 
1Pft
+
−∆  0.31075 (0.0000) 0.4937 (0.0000) 0.14953 (0.0772) 0.35266 (0.0052) 0.3652 (0.0000) 
2Pft
+
−∆  -- -- 0.14953 (0.0772) 0.26451 (0.0000) 0.2739 (0.0000) 
3Pft
+
−∆  -- -- 0.09969 (0.0772) -- -- 
LR+ 0.6215 
(0.0000) 
0.9874 
(0.0000) 
0.49843 
(0.0772) 
0.88171 
(0.0052) 
0.91301 
(0.0000) 
Pft
−∆ (SR-) 0.01105 (0.4209) 0.19443 (0.0012) 0.24388 (0.0000) 0.19699 (0.0373) 0.25545 (0.0000) 
1Pft
−
−∆  0.01894 (0.4209) 0.25923 (0.012) 0.32518 (0.0000) 0.19699 (0.0373) 0.38317 (0.0000) 
2Pft
−
−∆  0.02368 (0.4209) 0.19443 (0.0012) 0.24388 (0.0000) -- 0.38317 (0.0000) 
3Pft
−
−∆  0.02526 (0.4209) -- -- -- 0.25545 (0.0000) 
4Pft
−
−∆  0.02368 (0.4209) -- -- -- -- 
5Pft
−
−∆  0.01894 (0.4209) -- -- -- -- 
6Pft
−
−∆  0.01105 (0.4209) -- -- -- -- 
LR- 0.1326 
(0.4209) 
0.64808 
(0.0012) 
0.81294 
(0.0000) 
0.39399 
(0.0373) 
1.27723 
(0.0000) 
1ECTt
+
−  
-0.029021 
(0.8185) 
-0.082744 
(0.4599) 
0.046736 
(0.6976) 
0.125001 
(0.3158) 
-0.274774 
(0.0363) 
1ECTt
−
−  
-0.75598 
(0.5772) 
-0.120677 
(0.3332) 
0.221971 
(0.0978) 
-0.125171 
(0.3674) 
-0.398899 
(0.0000) 
1Prt−∆  -- -- -0.262951 (0.0602) -0.428779 (0.0158) -- 
2Prt−∆  -- -0.125292 (0.2344) -- -- -0.548005 (0.0000) 
3Prt−∆  -0.204251 (0.0431) -- -- 0.13835 (0.1735) -- 
F-statistic for model 
superiority 
Lag structure 
different 
Lag structure 
different 
1.3841 
(0.2523) 
6.3396 
(0.0001) 
Lag structure 
different 
R2 0.2304 0.2920 0.2024 0.2715 0.4711 
DW 2.04 1.99 2.08 1.94 2.01 
AIC -3.3749 -2.1275 -2.3495 -2.1819 -2.8875 
SIC -3.2196 -1.9740 -2.1960 -2.0018 -2.7341 
a Parameter Estimate 
b p-value 
c Variable definitions are found in Table 2.7 
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Table 2.12.  Elasticities of Price Transmission for Whole Milk with the Houck Approach 
 Atlanta Boston Chicago Dallas Hartford Seattle St. Louis 
EPT_POS_SRa 0.1527 0.2637 0.2091 0.1247 0.2360 0.0923 0.1386 
EPT_NEG_SRb 0.0258 0.0630 0.0737 0.1077 0.0693 0.0517 0.1306 
EPT_POS_LRc 0.3054 0.5275 0.4182 0.2494 0.4720 0.3077 0.2772 
EPT_NEG_LRd 0.0516 0.1261 0.2459 0.3592 0.1386 0.1034 0.2613 
a EPT_POS_SR  short run elasticity of price transmission for rising farm prices 
b EPT_NEG_SR  short run elasticity of price transmission for falling farm prices 
c EPT_POS_LR  long run elasticity of price transmission for rising farm prices 
d EPT_NEG_LR  long run elasticity of price transmission for falling farm prices 
 
Table 2.13.  Elasticities of Price Transmission for Two Percent Milk with the Houck Approach 
 Atlanta Boston Chicago Dallas Hartford Seattle St. Louis 
EPT_POS_SRa 0.1451 0.2377 0.2148 0.0375 0.2046 0.0717 0.1008 
EPT_NEG_SRb 0.1059 0.0596 0.1135 0.1048 0.0650 0.0597 0.1660 
EPT_POS_LRc 0.2902 0.4754 0.4297 0.1878 0.4092 0.2390 0.3360 
EPT_NEG_LRd 0.0319 0.1193 0.2270 0.3494 0.1301 0.1194 0.3321 
a EPT_POS_SR  short run elasticity of price transmission for rising farm prices 
b EPT_NEG_SR  short run elasticity of price transmission for falling farm prices 
c EPT_POS_LR  long run elasticity of price transmission for rising farm prices 
d EPT_NEG_LR  long run elasticity of price transmission for falling farm prices 
 
Table 2.14.  Elasticities of Price Transmission for Whole Milk with the ECM Approach 
 Atlanta Chicago Dallas 
EPT_POS_SRa 0.1761 0.2278 0.1762 
EPT_NEG_SRb 0.0164 0.0746 0.1258 
EPT_POS_LRc 0.3523 0.4556 0.3524 
EPT_NEG_LRd 0.0820 0.2486 0.4196 
a EPT_POS_SR  short run elasticity of price transmission for rising farm prices 
b EPT_NEG_SR  short run elasticity of price transmission for falling farm prices 
c EPT_POS_LR  long run elasticity of price transmission for rising farm prices 
d EPT_NEG_LR  long run elasticity of price transmission for falling farm prices 
 
Table 2.15.  Elasticities of Price Transmission for Two Percent Milk with the ECM Approach 
 Atlanta Chicago Dallas Seattle St. Louis 
EPT_POS_SRa 0.1561 0.2267 0.0482 0.0994 0.1290 
EPT_NEG_SRb 0.0054 0.0844 0.1141 0.0695 0.1107 
EPT_POS_LRc 0.3123 0.4534 0.2414 0.3315 0.4301 
EPT_NEG_LRd 0.0650 0.2814 0.3805 0.1391 0.5536 
a EPT_POS_SR  short run elasticity of price transmission for rising farm prices 
b EPT_NEG_SR  short run elasticity of price transmission for falling farm prices 
c EPT_POS_LR  long run elasticity of price transmission for rising farm prices 
d EPT_NEG_LR  long run elasticity of price transmission for falling farm prices 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 3.1. Symbol and Variable Definitions  
Symbol Firm 
S&P500 S&P 500 Index  
PRND Prandium Inc.  
SYS Sysco Corporation 
OSI Outback Steakhouse, Inc. 
DRI Darden Restaurants, Inc. 
EAT Brinker International, Inc. 
APPB Applebee's International Incorporated
RMK Aramark Corp 
PFGC Preformance Food Group Company 
SUV Supervalu, Inc 
AHO Koninkiljke Ahold NV 
 
 
Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Companies' Rates of Return 
Variable 
Date 
Range N Mean Median Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
PRND 1 120 0.019054 0 0.309235 -0.38824 2.823529 
S&P500-1 1 120 0.00104 0.001836 0.008995 -0.02492 0.022385 
SYS-2 2 120 -0.00063 -0.00155 0.010089 -0.02641 0.023451 
S&P500-2 2 120 -0.00022 0.000504 0.007166 -0.01556 0.016365 
SYS-3 3 141 -0.0010 0.012092 -0.0018 -0.0730 0.0329 
S&P500-3 3 141 -0.0002 0.007336 0.000468 -0.01632 0.016365 
OSI  3 141 -0.00075 -0.00096 0.015421 -0.05756 0.031568 
DRI  3 141 -0.00023 -0.00136 0.013811 -0.03828 0.056911 
EAT  3 141 -0.00112 -0.00028 0.014258 -0.07602 0.034574 
APPB 3 141 -0.00263 -0.00083 0.032068 -0.3329 0.074155 
RMK 3 141 -0.00037 0 0.012095 -0.04263 0.032122 
PFGC 3 141 -0.00239 -0.0012 0.022575 -0.18509 0.070103 
SUV 3 141 -0.00051 -0.00128 0.013143 -0.04351 0.039837 
AHO 3 141 -0.0018 -0.00288 0.021295 -0.07989 0.045882 
Note: Units of Rates of Return are presented in decimal form. 
There are three different data ranges: 1,2,3. 
Data Range 1: May 15, 2003 to Nov 3, 2003.  
Data Range 2: February 10, 2004 to August 3, 2004. 
Data Range 3: February 10, 2004 to August 31, 2004.  
Variable definitions are found in Table 3.1 
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Table 3.3. Estimated Parameters of the Event Study Models for Prandium and Sysco 
  
Prandium Simple 
market model 
Sysco Simple market 
model 
Sysco GARCH 
approach 
β0 0.0177 -0.0004 -0.000887 
P-value 0.5350 0.53 0.3020 
β1 1.2587 0.573 0.56217 
P-value 0.6914 0 0 
D1 - 0.002 0.00610 
P-value - 0.712 .5983 
D2 - -0.004 -0.02898 
P-value - 0.557 0..9983 
D3 - - -0.00234 
P-value - - 0.9877 
D4   -0.00056 
P-value   0.9497 
D5   -0.0372 
P-value   0.7657 
α0 - - 8.86E-05 
P-value - - 0.016 
α1 - - 0.201788 
P-value - - 0.1761 
φ1 - - -0.292592 
P-value - - 0.5261 
D6 - - 0.000418 
P-value - - 0.0447 
Observations 120 120 141 
R2 0.002 0.171 0.081917 
DW 1.98 1.855 2.321533 
SIC -2.327 -9.269 -6.05485 
AIC -2.35 -9.339 -6.24307 
Iterations      477 
 
Table 3.4. Empirical Results of the White Test for Sysco Equation (7) Simple Market Model 
Specification 
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 0.629094     Probability 0.642711 
Obs*R-squared 2.569559     Probability 0.632225 
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Table 3.5. Testing for Sysco Abnormal Rates of Returns 
Day of the event   
Sysco t -0.00695 
Sysco t hat 0.001172 
Abnormal Returns -0.00812 
CI up 0.011281 
CI down -0.02518 
    
Day after the event   
Sysco t+1 -0.00175 
Sysco t+1 hat -0.00447 
Abnormal Returns 0.002722 
CI up 0.016482 
CI down -0.01998 
    
Two days after the event 
Sysco t+2 -0.01431 
Sysco t+2 hat -0.00149 
Abnormal Returns -0.01281 
CI up 0.003924 
CI down -0.03254 
    
Three days after the event 
Sysco t+3 -0.01511 
Sysco t+3 hat -0.00868 
Abnormal Returns -0.00642 
CI up 0.003124 
CI down -0.03334 
    
Four days after the event 
Sysco t+4 0.004511 
Sysco t+4 hat -0.00914 
Abnormal Returns 0.013654 
CI up 0.022742 
CI down -0.01372 
Note: t is the day of the event. (August 3, 2004) 
          hat is the forecast one day prior the event. 
          Abnormal returns is calculated using formula (2) 
          CI refers to the Confidence Intervals in formula (3)   
 
Table 3.6. White Test Results for GARCH Specification  
F-statistic 21.45698     Probability 0.000000 
Obs*R-squared 62.43547     Probability 0.000000 
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Table 3.7. Results from SUR, Equation (3.10) 
Systematic Risk  Day of the event coefficient     Four days after the event 
  Coefficient   Coefficient   Coefficient 
0.45237  -0.0033  -0.0022 β1,syy 
 (0.0009)  
δsyy 
 (0.7786)  
ρsyy 
 (0.7062) 
0.8133  -0.0079  0.0061 β1,appb 
 (0.0276)  
δappb 
 (0.8029)  
ρ,appb 
 (0.7066) 
0.77021)  -0.0042  -0.0068 β1,dri 
 (0)  
δdri 
 (0.7364)  
ρdri 
 (0.2878) 
0.93482  -0.0173  (0.00131 β1,eat 
 (0)  
δeat 
 (0.1633)  
ρeat 
 (0.8365) 
1.16961  0.0042  0.00142 β1,osi 
 (0)  
δosi 
 (0.7445)  
ρosi 
 (0.8299) 
0.39606  -0.0091  -0.009 β1,rmk 
 (0.0034)  
δrmk 
 (0.4322)  
ρrmk 
 (0.1291) 
0.35372  0.07522  0.00149 β1,pfgc 
 (0.1614)  
δpfgc 
 (0.0005)  
ρpfgc 
 (0.8934) 
0.83301  -0.0072  0.00233 β1,suv 
 (0)  
δsuv 
 (0.5395)  
ρsuv 
 (0.6971) 
1.4204  -0.0006  -0.0046 β1,aho 
 (0)  
δaho 
 (0.9739)  
ρaho 
 
 (0.6252) 
 
Table 3.8. Residual Correlation Matrix of System 3.10 
 SYY APPB DRI EAT OSI RMK PFGC SUV AHO 
SYY 1 -0.01571 0.136911 0.076015 0.223594 -0.04291 0.070412 0.100426 -0.05549 
APPB -0.01571 1 0.115614 0.190761 0.139936 0.025557 0.021789 -0.02082 -0.04855 
DRI 0.136911 0.115614 1 0.307202 0.338036 0.192727 0.180433 0.014072 -0.06258 
EAT 0.076015 0.190761 0.307202 1 0.412702 0.184744 0.006433 -0.09462 0.029822
OSI 0.223594 0.139936 0.338036 0.412702 1 0.01363 0.157645 -0.12459 -0.13532 
RMK -0.04291 0.025557 0.192727 0.184744 0.01363 1 0.074749 -0.06717 -0.04936 
PFGC 0.070412 0.021789 0.180433 0.006433 0.157645 0.074749 1 0.189165 -0.0078 
SUV 0.100426 -0.02082 0.014072 -0.09462 -0.12459 -0.06717 0.189165 1 0.064932
AHO -0.05549 -0.04855 -0.06258 0.029822 -0.13532 -0.04936 -0.0078 0.064932 1 
 Variable definitions are found in Table 3.1 
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Daily Rates of Returns: PRANDIUM vs S&P500
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Figure 3.1. Daily Rates of Return: Prandium vs S&P 
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Daily Rates of Returns: Sysco vs S&P and the 
binary variables
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 Figure 3.2. Daily Rates of Return: Sysco vs S&P  
 
D1 is Sysco’s earnings news day 
 D2 is Sysco’s acquisitions news day 
 Event days is the day that the event took place (August 3rd, 2004) 
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Figure 3.3. Residuals for GARCH Specification 
 
Figure 3.4. Daily Rates of Returns for Food Service and Restaurant Firms 
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Figure 3.5. Systematic Risk Coefficient for Sysco's SUR (10) 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Area of Study 
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Figure 4.2. Supply Contraction as a Consequence of a Disease Outbreak and No 
Changes in Preferences 
 
Figure 4.3. Supply and Demand Contraction as a Consequence of a Disease Outbreak 
and Changes in Preferences 
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Figure 4.4. Domestic and International Markets Before and After an Outbreak 
Source: Schoenbaun and Disney (2003). 
Supplemental Information Relevant to Chapter III 
 
Companies Profiles according to Market Report. 17 
 
Prandium (PRND) The Prandium name was adopted in April, 1999, not too long after 
the completion of a merger on October 30, 1998 between Koo Koo Roo, Inc. and Family 
Restaurants, Inc.  The predecessor company, Family Restaurants, Inc. ("FRI") was 
incorporated in 1986. Prandium was the holder of Chi-Chi’s restaurants.  
 
Sysco Corporation (SYY). This group's principal activities are to market and distribute 
food and related products to the foodservice industry. The group's products and services 
are provided to restaurants, healthcare and educational facilities, lodging establishments, 
other foodservice; they have around 390,000 customers. The other segments include 
specialty produce, custom-cut meat, Asian cuisine foodservice, and lodging industry 
products segments. The group's specialty produce companies distribute fresh produce 
and, on a limited basis, other foodservice products. Specialty meat companies distribute 
                                                 
17 This is the official information that companies provide to all financial institution as is available for free 
in Yahoo, e-trade, The New Tork Times and CNN Money.  
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custom-cut fresh steaks, other meat, seafood, and poultry. As of July 2, 2005, the group 
operated 170 facilities throughout the United States and Canada. 
 
Prandium publicly traded competitors: 
 
Applebee's International Incorporated (APPB). This group's principal activity is to 
develop, franchise, and operate casual dining restaurants under the name Applebee's 
Neighborhood Grill and Bar. The restaurants feature a broad selection of entrees, 
including beef, chicken, pork, seafood, and pasta items prepared in a variety of cuisines, 
as well as appetizers, salads, sandwiches, specialty drinks and desserts. The restaurant is 
designed as an attractive, friendly neighborhood establishment featuring moderately-
priced quality food items, table service, and a comfortable atmosphere. These restaurants 
are located in free-standing buildings, end caps of strip shopping centers, and shopping 
malls. As of February 8, 2006, there were 1,813 restaurants operating in 49 states and 14 
international countries. 
 
Brinker International, Inc. (EAT). This group's principal activity is to own, operate, 
develop, and franchise various restaurant concepts. The primary restaurant concepts 
include: Chili's Grill and Bar, Romano's Macaroni Grill, On The Border Mexican Grill 
and Cantina, and Maggiano's Little Italy. The group jointly owns and develops the 
Rockfish Seafood Grill. It operates in the United States, Australia, Canada, Egypt, Great 
Britain, Germany, Latin America, South America, the Middle East, and Asia. As of 
December 28, 2005, there were 1,638 company-operated, jointly-developed, and 
franchised units. 
 
Darden Restaurants, Inc. (DRI). This group's principal activity is to own and operate 
restaurants. The restaurants are operated under the trademarks: Darden Restaurants (R), 
Red Lobster (R), Olive Garden (R), Bahama Breeze (R), and Smokey Bones (R) BBQ 
Sports Bar. As of March 21, 2006, the group owns and operates 1,390 Red Lobster(R), 
Olive Garden(R), Bahama Breeze(R), Smokey Bones(R) BBQ, and Seasons 52 
restaurants. 
 
Outback Steakhouse, Inc. (OSI). This group's principal activity is to develop and 
operate casual dining restaurants. It offers consumers of different demographic 
backgrounds an array of dining alternatives suited for differing needs. The restaurants 
serve dinner only and feature a limited menu of seasoned steaks, prime rib, chops, 
barbecued ribs, chicken, fish and pasta. As of March 1, 2006, the group operates 
restaurants including a total of 921 Outback Steakhouses, 203 Carrabba, Italian Grills, 
99 Bonefish Grills, 40 Fleming Prime Steakhouse and Wine Bars, 20 Roy, two Lee Roy 
Selmon, 3 Paul Lee Chinese Kitchens, and 33 Cheeseburger in Paradise restaurants. The 
operations of the group are carried out in 50 states and 21 countries internationally. 
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Sysco’s publicly traded competitors:  
 
Koninklijke Ahold NV(AHO). The group's principal activity is to provide food 
primarily through retail trade outlets, along with complementary food service activities. 
As of December 2002, the group operated or serviced 5,606 stores, including 790 
franchise stores and 450 associated stores, with the majority of the franchise stores & 
associated stores located in The Netherlands. The store format primarily used by the 
group is the supermarket, along with operating or servicing hypermarkets, discount 
stores, specialty stores, cash and carry stores and convenience stores, operating primarily 
in Europe and the United States, with some operations in Latin America and Asia 
Pacific. Some stores operated by the group include Albert Heijn, Stop & Shop, Giant-
Landover and Giant Carlisle. 
 
Aramark Corporation (RMK). The Group's principal activity is to provide managed 
services to business, educational, healthcare and governmental institutions and sports, 
entertainment and recreational facilities. It operates in two segments: Food and Support 
Services and Uniform and Career Apparel. The Food and Support Services segment 
provides food, refreshment, specialized dietary and support services, including facility 
maintenance and housekeeping. The Uniform and Career Apparel segment includes the 
rental, sale, cleaning, maintenance delivery of personalized uniform and career apparel. 
It also includes direct marketing of personalized uniform and career apparel, public 
safety equipment and accessories. The Group has International operations in Belgium, 
Canada, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
 
Performance Food Group Company (PFGC) and its subsidiaries engage in the 
marketing and distribution of brand food and nonfood products to various customers in 
the foodservice industry primarily in the United States. These products include entrees, 
canned and dry groceries, frozen foods, refrigerated and dairy products, paper products 
and cleaning supplies, produce, restaurant equipment, and other supplies. The company 
operates through two segments, Broadline Foodservice Distribution (Broadline); and 
Customized Foodservice Distribution (Customized). The Broadline segment markets and 
distributes national and proprietary brand food and nonfood products to street and chain 
customers through its 19 Broadline distribution facilities in the eastern, midwestern, 
northeastern, southern, and southeastern United States. The Customized segment focuses 
on serving casual and family dining chain restaurants in the United States. It serves 14 
restaurant chains nationwide and 3 restaurant chains internationally. The company 
primarily serves independent restaurants, hotels, cafeterias, schools, healthcare facilities, 
and other institutional customers, as well as multi-unit or chain customers, such as 
regional and national family, casual dining, quick-service restaurants, and other 
institutional customers. Performance Food Group was founded in 1925 and is 
headquartered in Lebanon, Tennessee. 
 
 
  
113
SUPERVALU, INC. (SVU) operates as a grocery company in the United States. It 
offers various food and nonfood products, including groceries, meats, dairy products, 
frozen foods, deli, bakery, fresh fruits and vegetables, health and beauty aids, general 
merchandise, seasonal items, and tobacco products. The company conducts its retail 
operations under three retail food store formats: extreme value stores, price superstores, 
and supermarkets. As of January 11, 2006, SUPERVALU had 1,546 retail grocery 
locations. In addition, it provides food distribution and related logistics services, 
including warehouse management, transportation, procurement, contract manufacturing, 
and logistics engineering and management services for the retail grocery channel. The 
company’s customers include single and multiple grocery store independent operators, 
regional and national chains, mass merchants, and the military. SUPERVALU was 
founded in 1871 and is headquartered in Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
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APPENDIX C 
Table 4.1. Farm Types, Descriptions, and Composition from the Epidemiologic Model 
Farm 
Type (t) 
Farm Description 
(f) 
Composition by type of animals (t) 
1 Beef Grazing 
Clave steers, Calve heifers, Yearling steer, Yearling heifers, Beef cow, Milk 
cow and Bull 
2 Dairy 
Clave steers, Calve heifers, Yearling steer, Yearling heifers, Beef cow, Milk 
cow and Bull 
3 Pig Sows Boars Male piglet Female piglet Male wean Female wean  
4 Sheep Ewes, Rams, Wlms, Elms, Wlms yearling and Elms yearling  
5 
Mixed  
(beef and sheep) 
Clave steers, Calve heifers, Yearling steer, Yearling heifers, Beef cow, Milk 
cow and Bull 
Ewes, Rams, Wlms, Elms, Wlms yearling and Elms yearling 
6 Backyard 
Clave steers, Calve heifers, Yearling steer, Yearling heifers, Beef cow, Milk 
cow and Bull 
7 Feedlot (beef) 
Clave steers, Calve heifers, Yearling steer, Yearling heifers, Beef cow, Milk 
cow and Bull 
 
Table 4.2. Surveillance Cost per Animal 
Item Price 
Vaccination 6 
Disposal 11* 
Euthanasia 5.5 
SOURCE: Schoenbaun (2003) 
 
Table 4.3. Strategies  
Strategy Description 
1 Quarantine, surveillance, and slaughter latent, immune, or infected herds  
2 
 
Quarantine, surveillance,  and slaughter herds under any of these statuses: latent, immune, 
infected, or dangerous contacts 
3 
 
Quarantine, surveillance, and slaughter herds under any of these statuses: latent, immune, 
infected, or contiguous herds 
4 
 
Quarantine, surveillance, and slaughter latent, immune, or infected and perform ring 
vaccination 
5 
 
Quarantine, surveillance, and slaughter latent, immune, or infected herds and perform 
targeted vaccination 
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Table 4.4. Summary of Control Options for the Five Different Strategies 
Strategy 
 
Herds in 
quarantine 
 
Infected 
herds 
 
Herds under 
surveillance 
Total 
number 
of visits 
Total 
animals 
vaccinated 
Dangerous 
contact 
Herds 
Slaughtered 
herds 
1 3398 66 145 478 0 0 66 
2 4075 71 1442 7002 0 206 277 
3 3650 68 107 267 0 0 554 
4 1944 46 82 276 2440 0 1260 
5 2621 64 101 279 2394 0 1253 
 
 
Table 4.5. Composition of Herd as a Percentage of the Total Herd for Each Type of Farm  
Type of Animal Grazing Dairy Pig Sheep Mixed Backyard Feedlot  
Clave steers 17.00% 5.00% 0.00% 0.00% 15.00% 25.00% 25.00% 
Calve heifers 17.00% 5.00% 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 24.00% 15.00% 
Yearling steer 11.00% 5.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 10.00% 35.00% 
Yearling heifer 11.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 15.00% 10.00% 25.00% 
Beef cow 42.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 7.00% 30.00% 0.00% 
Milk cow 0.00% 74.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Bull 2.00% 1.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.00% 1.00% 0.00% 
Ewes (adult) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 31.00% 15.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Rams (adult) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 15.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Wether  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 23.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
lamb 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 23.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Wether yearling 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 11.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Ewe yearling 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 11.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Sows 0.00% 0.00% 10.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Boars 0.00% 0.00% 1.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Male piglet 0.00% 0.00% 30.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Female piglet 0.00% 0.00% 30.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Male wean 0.00% 0.00% 15.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Female wean 0.00% 0.00% 14.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Note: The first column describes all types of animals involved in the study. The next seven 
columns show the animal composition in each different types of farm. This composition is an 
average of the types of animals a farm has through a year.  
  
116
Table 4.6. Animal Prices  
Animal type Average Weight Price in cwt Price per head 
Clave steers 300 150 411 
Calve heifers 300 130 411 
Yearling steer 700 115 693 
Yearling heifer 700 120 693 
Beef cow 1200 100 1138 
Milk cow 1150 600 1850 
Bull  650 700 
Ewes (adult) 160 56 56 
Rams (adult) 230 56 70 
Wether  90 77.77778 70 
Lamb 80 72.5 58 
Wether yearling 60 116.6667 70 
Ewe yearling 50 116 58 
Sows 230 37 85 
Boars 229 42 96 
Male piglet 143 42 60 
Female piglet 143 42 60 
Male wean 119 42 50 
Female wean 119 42 50 
Source: USDA 
a Prices per cwt 
b Prices per head 
 
Table 4.7. Surveillance Costs per Herds 
Cost 
Small 
Herds 
Medium 
Herds 
Large 
Herd 
Appraisal  300 400 500 
Cleaning  5000 7000 10000 
Testing  150 200 400 
Visit  50 75 100 
SOURCE: Schoenbaun (2003) 
Small herds contain <100 animals 
Medium herds contain 100-450 
Large herds contain > 450 
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Table 4.8. Calculations Based on Strategy Types  
 Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Strategy 4 Strategy 5 
Total Market Value Loss $66,797,640 $123,958,600 $150,168,100 $379,825,300 $153,450,300 
Total Foregone Income $1,388,970 $5,282,730 $10,532,700 $24,068,970 $23,141,430 
Total Welfare Slaughter $38,597,870 $37,451,065 $37,223,990 $8,504,475 $31,579,075 
      
Total Direct Costs $106,784,480 $166,692,395 $197,924,790 $412,398,745 $208,170,805 
      
Total Slaughter Costs $2,395,971 $5,185,351 $7,480,873 $18,301,910 $11,124,790 
Surveilance $35,575 $317,100 $26,825 $20,900 $25,650 
Vaccination $0 $0 $0 $3,529,154 $843,508 
      
Total Extra Expenditures $2,431,546 $5,502,451 $7,507,698 $21,851,964 $11,993,948 
      
Total Indirect Costs $5,670,000 $5,670,000 $5,670,000 $5,670,000 $5,670,000 
      
Total Costs $114,886,026 $177,864,846 $211,102,488 $439,920,709 $225,834,753 
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APPENDIX D 
     PROGRAM 
 
******************************************************************** 
*An Economic Cost Module Program in GAMS       * 
*This program aplies the Conceptual Economic Model to an FMD hypotetical   * 
*outbreak. An Epidemiologic model's output is used as one of the inputs    * 
*and data sources for this program. The Epi model comes from the FAZD Center    * 
*at Texas A&M.           * 
*             * 
*Pablo Sherwell (main programmer) and Levan Elbakidze      * 
*Texas A&M University          * 
******************************************************************** 
 
*First, define each herd by (id) 
set id  
  /100*17472/; 
 
**VARIABLES THAT ENTER FROM THE EPI MODEL** 
************************************************** 
*These are the variables we get from the Epi model and are asociated with each 
*herd (id). 
*Please see definitions below the variables 
 
set inputfield 
  /STRATEGY 
CALCACRES 
CAT_NUM 
TYPE 
FARM 
ALL_STOCK 
CATEGORY 
STATUS 
Quarantine 
D_contact 
Infected 
CONTACT 
SOURCE 
HOW 
INF_DAY 
DX 
DAYS_TIL_D 
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DAYS_LEFT_ 
DAYS_LEFT1 
DAYS_LEFT2 
WHEN_INF 
WHEN_DEAD 
DAYS_REP 
DAYS_DX 
DC 
DAYS_DC 
CONTIG 
SP 
SURV 
DAYS_TIL_V 
N_VISITS 
VACC 
DAYS_TIL_1 
DAYS_TIL_I 
XCOORD 
YCOORD 
DIST 
PROXIMITY 
BEARING 
AREA 
NSP 
ZONE 
FID_ 
ACRES 
ID_1 
CAT_DEN 
OID_ 
CALCACRE_1 
ID_12 
CAT_NUM_1 
TYPE_1 
FARM_1 
ALL_STOC_1 
CATEGORY_1 
STATUS_1 
CONTACT_1 
SOURCE_1 
HOW_1 
INF_DAY_1 
DX_1 
DAYS_TIL_2 
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DAYS_LEF_1 
DAYS_LEF_2 
DAYS_LEF_3 
WHEN_INF_1 
WHEN_DEA_1 
DAYS_REP_1 
DAYS_DX_1 
DC_1 
DAYS_DC_1 
CONTIG_1 
SP_1 
SURV_1 
DAYS_TIL_3 
N_VISITS_1 
VACC_1 
DAYS_TIL_4 
DAYS_TIL_5 
XCOORD_1 
YCOORD_1 
DIST_1 
PROXIMIT_1 
BEARING_1 
AREA_1 
NSP_1 
ZONE_1 
Quarzone/; 
 
******************************** 
*DEFINITIONS of Relevant Variables* 
******************************** 
*STRATEGY: Type of Strategy used (1…n)-So far we have 5. 
 
*        Strategy 1 = infected herd slaughter 
*        Strategy 2 = infected herd slaughter + dangerous contact slaughter 
*        Strategy 3 = infected herd slaughter + contiguous herd slaughter 
*        Strategy 4 = infected herd slaughter + ring vaccination 
*        Strategy 5 = infected herd slaughter + targeted vaccination 
*        (herd types 1, 2 and 7 only) 
 
*CALCACRES: Size of premise in Acres 
 
*CAT_NUM : Number of heads per ID herd 
 
*TYPE = Type of herds 
  
121
* 1 = Beef 
* 2 = dairy 
* 3 = sheep 
* 4 = pig 
* 5 = mixed animal (beef/sheep) 
* 6 = backyard <10 
* 7 = feedlot 
 
*FARM: Farm type. Same as previous. 
 
*ALL_STOCK: Number of animals (except for type 5 = (Beef + Sheep). 
 
*ALL_STOCK and CAT_NUM = Sheep. 
 
*CATEGORY:  General variable to characterize the risk of exposure and spread of 
*    infection which would use a user defined scale and set of rules rather * 
*    than premise specific data. 
 
 
*STATUS 
*        0 = Susceptible: able to be infected. 
*        1 = Latent: infected but not yet infectious (no shedding of virus and therefore not  
yet actively spreading infection). 
*        2 = Infectious: infected and infectious (i.e. animals are shedding virus and 
infection  
can be spread). 
*        3 = Dead (removed): in the case of FMD this means a herd that has been  
slaughtered because of the disease. Conceivably, for a disease that has a very 
high mortality rate this could represent natural consequence of infection. 
*        4 = Immune: herd has recovered from disease, is not infectious and cannot be re- 
infected. 
 
*QUARANTINE: O means the herd was not in the quarantine zone, 1 means the herd *
  
*   was under quarantine 
 
*D_CONTACT (dangerous contact): 0 means the herd was not a dangerous 
*           contact(dc), 1 means the herd was a dc, -9999 means dc does 
*           not apply to that particular strategy. 
 
*INFECTED: 0 means the herd was not infected, 1 means the herd was infected. 
 
 
*CONTACT Herd ID of herds with contact with infected herd 
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*SOURCE Herd id of source of infectious contact 
 
*HOW     w = wind 
*        c = contact 
*        s = saleyard 
 
*INF_DAY 
 
* DX Day that the herd was detected 
 
* DC Dangerous Contact: herds that are not showing FMD symptoms but are considered 
to be high risk because of either: proximity (distance) or potential contact (direct or 
indirect) with infected herds. 
 
* CONTIG Contiguous: farm has been classified as a contiguous premise. Slaughter of 
all herds within a given radius of infected herds. 
 
* SP Suspect Premises 
*        1 = flagged as suspect 
*        -2 = herd cleared after surveillance visits. The minus allows for retrospective 
follow-up (what proportion of SP's were cleared). 
 
*SURV Indicates herd is under surveillance. farm is under surveillance. This constitutes 
visit(s) by a surveillance team to check for signs of the disease and possibly collect 
samples. 
*        1 = flagged for surveillance 
*        2 = herd has been visited at least once 
*        3 = herd is due for a visit today 
*        4 = herd missed being visited on due date 
*        -1 = herd has been cleared after 5 negative surveillance visits 
*        -2 = FMD confirmed during surveillance visit 
 
*DAYS_TIL_V Number of days from flagged until herd was vaccinated 
 
*N_VISITS Number of visits. Number of visits to surveillance herd 
*        If visits = 5 with no symptoms then herd cleared. 
 
*VACC Herd has been vaccinated 
*        1 = Flagged for vaccination 
*        2 = Vaccinated 
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set farmtype /grazing, dairy, sheep, pig, mixed, backyard, feedlot/; 
*These are the types of farms used in the Epi model (7 different type of farms) 
 
set animaltype /calst, calhef, yrlgst, yrlhef, bcow, mcow, bull, ewes, rams, wlms, elms, 
wyrl, eyrl, sows, boars, mpiglet, fpig, mwean, fwean/; 
 
*types of animals in each farmtype (i.e. grazing has (calst calst calhef yrlgst yrlhef bcow 
cow bull) 
 
                
*DESCRIPTION 
*Each type of farm has different types of animals by age and by sex 
 
*======BEEF FARMS: Grazing, dairy, backyard, feedlot 
 
*Calst = Clave steers (Calst) 
*Calhef = calve hefferds (calhef) 
*Yrlgst = Yearling steer (yrlgst) 
*Yrhef = Yearling hefferd (yrhef) 
*bcow = beef cow (cow) 
*mcow = milk cow 
*bull (bull) 
 
*=======SHEEP FARMS===== 
*types of animals for sheep farms: lamb (young),rams (adult male), 
*ewes, rams, flms, mlms, fyrl, myrl 
* ewe (adult female)  160 pounds  = $89 dlls per head average 
* rams (adult male)   230 pounds  = $128 
* mlamb (young male)  90 pounds   = $ 105 
* flamb (young female) 80 pounds  = $ 93 
* myearling (baby male) 60 pounds = $ 70 
* Fyearling (baby female) 50 pounds = $ 58 
*Prices in Texas by USDA 
*Sheep (adult) = $56 Cwt 
*Lamb (young) = $ 117 Cwt 
*USDA and http://showcase.netins.net/web/sam/ccidf.htm 
 
*=======PIG FARMS======= 
*types of animals in [ig farms: hog, sow, boar, piglets 
 
*Boar - An adult male pig   200-250 punds 
* Sow - An adult female pig 180-250 pounds 
* Piglet/farrow - A juvenile pig 100-180 
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* Shoat - A young pig between 100 to 180 lb (50 to 90 kg) 
* Gilt - An immature female pig 
* Barrow - A castrated male pig 
* Hog - a domestic or wild adult swine, especially one raised for slaughter because they 
fatten quickly; in its original sense it means a castrated boar. 
* Swine - Synonym for "pigs" (plural) 
 
*Prices according to USDA 
*Sows=$37 Cwt 
*Barrows and Gilts = $42 Cwt 
*Hogs=$42 cwt 
 
*Average Prices per head 
*Sows $85 
*Boar $96 
*Piglet $60 
*shoat $50 
 
*====================== 
 
set carcass /burial, incineration, composting, rendering/; 
set herdsize /smallherd, medherd, largeherd/; 
*Herd size is consistent with Diseney (2001): Small herd contain < 100 animals 
(smallherd) 
*                                             Medium Herds 100-450 animals (medherd) 
*                                             Large herds > 450 animals (largeherds) 
 
*EpiData is the output table we obtained from the Epi model table of results 
parameter EpiData(id, inputfield); 
$call 'Gdxxrw results1_econstr3.xls Output=EpiData.gdx par=EpiData Rng=a1 cdim=1 
rdim=1'; 
$GDXin  EpiData 
$load   EpiData 
 
*PremiseDescription will capture the EpiData. This is usefull for later computation 
leaving EpiData intact 
parameter PremiseDescription(id, inputfield); 
 
*Cattle status: to account for the status of a particular ID cattle (i.e. 0 = susceptible; 1 = 
latent; 2 = infected; 3 = immune; 4 = dead) 
parameter Cattlestatus(id, inputfield); 
PremiseDescription(id, inputfield) = EpiData(id, inputfield); 
Cattlestatus(id, inputfield) = EpiData(id, inputfield);*Costs of animals in dollars 
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parameter animalcost(animaltype) /calst 411, calhef 411, yrlgst 693, yrlhef 693, bcow 
1138, mcow 1850, bull 700, ewes 56.4, rams 70, wlms 105, elms 93, wyrl 70, eyrl 58, 
sows 85, boars 96, mpiglet 60, fpig 60, mwean 50, fwean 50/; 
 
 
*Real costs: 
*The costs were obtained from the USDA, NASS. Agricultural Prices (2006) 
*The price for bovine animals are calculated using average weight. 
*Calves average weight = 300 pounds 
*Yearlings av weight = 700 pounds 
*Av cow weight = 1150 
 
*parameter animalcost(animaltype) /calst 150, calhef 130, yrlgst 115, yrlhef 120, cow 
600, bull 650/; 
*This data comes from Amarillo live stock auction 2005 (USDA Data) 
*In APHIS Carc Disposalthe FED Gov will pay only 100 per head as indemnisation. 250 
in Disney 
 
 
*Daily Foregone Income of the farms 
parameter foregoneincome(farmtype) /grazing 203, dairy 280, sheep 228, pig 343, mixed 
228, backyard 191, feedlot 684/; 
*USDA 
 
 
*Herd Composition 
Table composition(farmtype,animaltype) 
*Each farm herd has different composition depending on the farm type. 
*This numbers come from Doug and are simply estimations. 
*For the backyard the estimation is a gueess. It is impossible to know the 
*composition of backyards. They vary across each of them. 
 
 
                    calst  calhef  yrlgst  yrlhef  bcow  mcow   bull   ewes rams wlms elms wyrl eyrl sows boars mpiglet fpig mwean   fwean 
grazing          0.17   0.17    0.11    0.11    0.42        0      0.02   0        0     0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0 
dairy             0.17   0.17    0.11    0.11    0     0.43   0.01   0        0     0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0              0        0 
pig                     0         0         0       0       0     0          0      0        0     0        0        0        0        0.1      0.01    0.3      0.3      0.15    .14 
sheep               0      0            0       0       0     0      0      0.31     0.01  0.23    0.23     0.11     0.11      0        0        0        0        0       0 
mixed             0.10   0.10     0.1    0.1     0.30  0    0.01   0.03   0.01  0.02    0.02     0.01    0.01       0          0       0       0        0       0 
backyard         0.25   0.24    0.1     0.1     0.3   0      0.01   0        0     0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0 
Feedlot            0.25   0.15    0.35    0.25    0     0      0      0        0     0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0        0 ; 
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*PremiseType 
parameter premisetype(farmtype) premisetype descrition 
*If FarmType = 1 then feedlot >=10 heads per ID 
*If FarmType= 6 backyard < 10 heads 
   /Grazing 1 
   dairy 2 
   sheep 3 
   pig 4 
   mixed 5 
   backyard 6 
   feedlot 7/; 
 
 
****************************************************************** 
*DESCRIPTION OF MAYOR COST VARIABLES FOR THE FMD MODEL 
*Based on Disney (2001) he uses USDA-APHIS FMD Guideline 
****************************************************************** 
*SLAUGHTER COSTS: 
*+++++++++++++++ 
 
*Slaughter costs are divided in appraisal, euthanasia, carcass disposal and cleaning 
 
parameter costappraisal(herdsize) per herd dependind on herd size 
         /smallherd 300 
         medherd 400 
         largeherd 500/; 
 
*Cost of Euthanasia per animal 5.5 dollars (regardless of size) 
scalar costeuthanasia; 
costeuthanasia = 5.5; 
 
*Cost of indemnification per head 250 (which we are not using so far) 
 
parameter costdisposal(herdsize) per animal depending on herd size 
         /smallherd 11 
          medherd   11 
         largeherd  12/; 
 
parameter costcleaning(herdsize) (this includes celaning and disinfection) per herd 
depending on herd size 
         /smallherd 5000 
          medherd   7000 
         largeherd  10000/; 
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******************************************************************* 
*SURVEILANCE COST* 
*++++++++++++++++ 
*Twice a week visits on 15km radius during 30 days for sucept herds 
 
parameter costtest(herdsize) per herd depending on herd size 
         /smallherd 150 
          medherd   200 
         largeherd  400/; 
 
parameter costvisit(herdsize) per herd 
          /smallherd  50 
           medherd    75 
          largeherd  100/; 
 
********************************************************************** 
*VACCINATION COSTS* 
*+++++++++++++++++ 
 
scalar vaccinecost; 
vaccinecost = 6; 
*$6 dlls per head 
*This number is from Disney 
 
parameter vaccinecostfix(herdsize) 
         /smallherd 300 
         medherd    500 
         largeherd  800/; 
 
*END OF COST VARIABLES 
*********************************************************************** 
 
parameter herdsizedefinition(herdsize) 
         /smallherd 100 
         medherd 450 
         largeherd 450/; 
*Herd size is consistent with Diseney (2001): Small herd contain < 100 animals 
(smallherd) 
*                                             Medium Herds 100-450 animals (medherd) 
*                                             Large herds > 450 animals (largeherds) 
 
*bring the original 
 
set link(id,farmtype, herdsize); 
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 link(id,farmtype, "smallherd")$(premisedescription(id,"type")= premisetype(farmtype) 
     and (premisedescription (id,"cat_num") lt herdsizedefinition("smallherd")))=yes; 
 link(id,farmtype, "medherd")$(premisedescription(id,"type")= premisetype(farmtype) 
     and (premisedescription (id,"cat_num") le herdsizedefinition("medherd")) 
     and (premisedescription (id,"cat_num") ge herdsizedefinition("smallherd")))=yes; 
 link(id,farmtype, "largeherd")$(premisedescription(id,"type")= premisetype(farmtype) 
     and (premisedescription (id,"cat_num") gt herdsizedefinition("largeherd")))=yes; 
****** 
*Segregating Mix Farms 
****** 
 
 
******************* 
*CALCULATION COSTS* 
******************* 
*COST IS Broken into two categories: lostvalue market, slaughter cost, surveillance cost 
and vaccination cost 
*lost value relates to the market lost value 
 
*=======LOSS Market value is calculated by type of farm 
*Lost market value for grazing cattle farms 
 
scalar lostvalmkgrazing; 
 
  lostvalmkgrazing= sum[(link(id,farmtype, herdsize), animaltype), 
premiseDescription(id, "CAT_NUM") $((Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0) and 
(cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 1)) 
                *(Composition(farmtype,animaltype))*animalcost(animaltype)]; 
 
*==============================================================
*Lost market value for dairy farms 
scalar lostvalmkdairy; 
 
  lostvalmkdairy= sum[(link(id,farmtype, herdsize), animaltype), premiseDescription(id, 
"CAT_NUM") $((Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0) and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 2)) 
                *(Composition(farmtype,animaltype))*animalcost(animaltype)]; 
 
*==============================================================
*Lost market value for sheep farms 
scalar lostvalmksheep; 
 
  lostvalmksheep= sum[(link(id,farmtype, herdsize), animaltype), premiseDescription(id, 
"CAT_NUM") $((Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0) and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 3)) 
                *(Composition(farmtype,animaltype))*animalcost(animaltype)]; 
  
129
*============================================================== 
*Lost market value for pig farms 
scalar lostvalmkpigs; 
 
lostvalmkpigs= sum[(link(id,farmtype, herdsize), animaltype), premiseDescription(id,  
 "CAT_NUM") $((Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0) and cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 4)) 
             *(Composition(farmtype,animaltype))*animalcost(animaltype)]; 
*============================================================== 
*Lost market value for mix farms (beef and sheep) 
scalar lostvalmkmix; 
 
 lostvalmkmix= sum[(link(id,farmtype, herdsize), animaltype), premiseDescription(id,  
"ALL_STOCK") $((Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0) and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 
5))*(Composition(farmtype,animaltype))*animalcost(animaltype)]; 
 
*============================================================== 
*Lost market value for backyard little farms (less than 10 heads) 
 
scalar lostvalmkbackyard; 
 
  lostvalmkbackyard= sum[(link(id,farmtype, herdsize), animaltype),  
premiseDescription(id, "CAT_NUM") $((Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0) 
and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 
6))*(Composition(farmtype,animaltype))*animalcost(animaltype)]; 
*============================================================== 
*Lost market value for feedlot 
 
scalar lostvalmkfeedlot; 
 
lostvalmkfeedlot= sum[(link(id,farmtype, herdsize), animaltype), premiseDescription(id,  
"CAT_NUM") $((Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0) and 
(cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 7) *(Composition(farmtype,animaltype)) 
*animalcost(animaltype)]; 
*============================================================== 
*total market value loss (sum of all lost market value costs) 
 
scalar totalmarketloss; 
 
  totalmarketloss= lostvalmkgrazing + lostvalmksheep + lostvalmkdairy + lostvalmkpigs 
+ lostvalmkmix + lostvalmkbackyard + lostvalmkfeedlot; 
 
*==============================================================
*FOREGONE INCOME FOR 90 Days 
*foregone income fpr beef grazing 
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scalar foregoneincomebeef; 
 
foregoneincomebeef=sum[(link(id,farmtype,herdsize))$((Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0) 
and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 1)), foregoneincome(farmtype)*90]; 
*============================================================== 
 
scalar foregoneincomedairy; 
 
foregoneincomedairy=sum[(link(id,farmtype,herdsize))$((Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0) 
and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 2)), foregoneincome(farmtype)*90]; 
*============================================================== 
scalar foregoneincomesheep; 
 
foregoneincomesheep=sum[(link(id,farmtype,herdsize))$((Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0) 
and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 3)), foregoneincome(farmtype)*90]; 
*============================================================== 
 
scalar foregoneincomepig; 
 
foregoneincomepig=sum[(link(id,farmtype,herdsize))$((Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0) 
and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 4)), foregoneincome(farmtype)*90]; 
*============================================================== 
 
scalar foregoneincomemix; 
 
foregoneincomemix=sum[(link(id,farmtype,herdsize))$((Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0) 
and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 5)), foregoneincome(farmtype)*90]; 
*============================================================== 
 
scalar foregoneincomeback; 
 
foregoneincomeback=sum[(link(id,farmtype,herdsize))$((Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0) 
and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 6)), foregoneincome(farmtype)*90]; 
*============================================================== 
 
scalar foregoneincomefeed; 
 
foregoneincomefeed=sum[(link(id,farmtype,herdsize))$((Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0) 
and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 7)), foregoneincome(farmtype)*90]; 
 
*============================================================== 
*Total Foregone income 
 
scalar tforegoneincome; 
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tforegoneincome= foregoneincomebeef+foregoneincomedairy+foregoneincomesheep 
+foregoneincomepig+foregoneincomemix+foregoneincomeback+foregoneincomefeed; 
*============================================================== 
 
*cost of slaughter - appraisal, euthanesia, disposal, cleaning 
scalar costslaughter; 
 
 costslaughter=sum[(link(id,farmtype,herdsize))$(Cattlestatus(id, "status") gt 0), 
(premiseDescription(id, "CAT_NUM") *(costeuthanasia + costdisposal(herdsize)) 
                     + costappraisal(herdsize)+costcleaning(herdsize)) ]; 
*============================================================== 
 
*cost of surveilance (tests + visits) 
*From the SURV variable 
scalar costsurv; 
 
costsurv = sum[(link(id,farmtype,herdsize))$(Cattlestatus(id, "surv") ne 0), 
costtest(herdsize)+ costvisit(herdsize) ]; 
 
*============================================================== 
scalar costsvaccination; 
 
costsvaccination=sum[(link(id,farmtype,herdsize))$(premiseDescription(id, "vacc") gt 
0), premiseDescription(id, "cat_num")*vaccinecost + vaccinecostfix(herdsize)]; 
 
*============================================================== 
* WELFARE SLAUGHTER COSTS: 
*========================= 
 
*Welfer cost for Grazing cattle farms 
scalar welfaregrazing; 
 
welfaregrazing=sum[(link(id,farmtype, herdsize), animaltype), premiseDescription(id,  
"CAT_NUM") $((Cattlestatus(id, "status") eq 0) and (Cattlestatus(id, "Quarantine") eq 
1) and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 1)) 
*(Composition(farmtype,animaltype))*animalcost(animaltype)]; 
 
*============================================================== 
*Welfer cost for dairy farms 
 
scalar welfaredairy; 
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welfaredairy=sum[(link(id,farmtype, herdsize), animaltype), premiseDescription(id, 
"CAT_NUM") $((Cattlestatus(id, "status") eq 0) and (Cattlestatus(id, "Quarantine") eq 
1) and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 2))                
*(Composition(farmtype,animaltype))*animalcost(animaltype)]; 
 
*============================================================== 
*Welfer cost for sheep 
scalar welfaresheep; 
 
   welfaresheep=sum[(link(id,farmtype, herdsize), animaltype), premiseDescription(id, 
"CAT_NUM") $((Cattlestatus(id, "status") eq 0) and (Cattlestatus(id, "Quarantine") eq 
1) and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 3)) 
                *(Composition(farmtype,animaltype))*animalcost(animaltype)]; 
*============================================================== 
*Welfer cost for pig farms 
scalar welfarepig; 
 
   welfarepig=sum[(link(id,farmtype, herdsize), animaltype), premiseDescription(id, 
"CAT_NUM") $((Cattlestatus(id, "status") eq 0) and (Cattlestatus(id, "Quarantine") eq 
1) and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 4)) 
                *(Composition(farmtype,animaltype))*animalcost(animaltype)]; 
 
*============================================================== 
*Welfer cost for mixed farms (cattle and sheep) 
scalar welfaremixed; 
 
   welfaremixed=sum[(link(id,farmtype, herdsize), animaltype), premiseDescription(id, 
"CAT_NUM") $((Cattlestatus(id, "status") eq 0) and (Cattlestatus(id, "Quarantine") eq 
1) and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 5)) 
                *(Composition(farmtype,animaltype))*animalcost(animaltype)]; 
*==============================================================
*Welfer cost for backyard farms 
scalar welfareback; 
 
   welfareback=sum[(link(id,farmtype, herdsize), animaltype), premiseDescription(id, 
"CAT_NUM") $((Cattlestatus(id, "status") eq 0) and (Cattlestatus(id, "Quarantine") eq 
1) and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 6)) 
                *(Composition(farmtype,animaltype))*animalcost(animaltype)]; 
*============================================================== 
*Welfer cost for feedlot operations. 
scalar welfarefeedlot; 
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   welfarefeedlot=sum[(link(id,farmtype, herdsize), animaltype), premiseDescription(id, 
"CAT_NUM") $((Cattlestatus(id, "status") eq 0) and (Cattlestatus(id, "Quarantine") eq 
1) and (cattlestatus(id,"type") eq 7)) 
                *(Composition(farmtype,animaltype))*animalcost(animaltype)]; 
*Total welfare cost 
scalar totwelfare; 
 
   totwelfare=welfaregrazing + welfaredairy + welfaresheep + welfarepig + 
welfaremixed + welfareback + welfarefeedlot 
 
*DISPLAY THE RESULTS 
*---------------------------------* 
display  PremiseDescription; 
display lostvalmkgrazing; 
display lostvalmksheep; 
display lostvalmkdairy; 
display lostvalmkpigs; 
display lostvalmkmix; 
display  lostvalmkbackyard; 
display  lostvalmkfeedlot; 
display totalmarketloss; 
display foregoneincomebeef; 
display foregoneincomedairy; 
display foregoneincomesheep; 
display foregoneincomepig; 
display foregoneincomemix; 
display foregoneincomeback; 
display foregoneincomefeed; 
display tforegoneincome; 
display costslaughter; 
display costsurv; 
display costsvaccination; 
display welfaregrazing; 
display welfaredairy; 
display welfaresheep ; 
display welfarepig; 
display welfaremixed; 
display welfareback; 
display welfarefeedlot; 
display totwelfare; 
 
*End of Program 
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